In this month’s edition of Around the World with Academy Securities, our Geopolitical Intelligence Group (GIG) focuses on the following geopolitical tensions that we are monitoring:

1. Israel | Hamas Ceasefire Talks
2. U.S. and Iran Nuclear Negotiations
3. Ukraine Ceasefire Discussions
4. Tensions with China Continue
5. Fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

We kick off this month’s ATW with an update on the fighting in Gaza as little progress has been made between the parties to end the war. While the IDF blockade of Gaza has increased the sense of urgency to try to come to a deal, the same key gating items remain. Next, we revisit the nuclear discussions between the U.S. and Iran. The third round of talks appear to have gone well, but the next round will be more technical in nature and the questions surrounding Iran’s demand to retain its own enrichment program have not yet been addressed. We also provide an update regarding the war in Ukraine as ceasefire talks seemed to falter once again following the U.S. peace proposal which included recognition of Russian control of Crimea. However, on April 28^th, following an announcement by President Trump that President Zelensky may be open to discussing giving up his claim to Crimea, President Putin declared a unilateral ceasefire that would last from May 8^th to May 11 (which was only motivated by trying to safeguard the VE Day parade in Moscow, as General Kearney from our team believes). We also report on the tensions with China as the trade war continues and China makes additional claims about territory in the South China Sea. We then provide an update on the fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the recent agreement between the DRC and Rwanda (which was brokered by the U.S.) to come up with a draft peace deal by May 2^nd. Finally, we are monitoring the tensions between India and Pakistan following the attack in Kashmir that we addressed in our SITREP last week.

Please reach out to your Academy coverage officer with any questions and we would be happy to engage.

Front and Center: Israel | Hamas Ceasefire Talks

As we reported in our March ATW, the IDF returned to war in Gaza on March 18^th, though mediators in Egypt are actively trying to encourage both parties to come to the table and discuss a deal that would see an end to the hostilities and create a pathway to reconstruction. The humanitarian situation in Gaza continues to deteriorate due to the blockade, which was meant to pressure Hamas. However, even as Hamas representatives attended the talks, the issues at hand are the same ones that have prevented the two sides from agreeing on a lasting peace deal. Israel is holding firm on its position that the only way forward would be for Hamas to disarm without Israel guaranteeing an end to the war, which was a red line for Hamas in previous negotiations. Unless there is a deal that includes the release of all the remaining hostages and sees Hamas disarm (with its leadership leaving Gaza permanently), there is little chance of any ceasefire coming to fruition in the near-term. Reconstruction operations or a peacekeeping mission led by other Arab nations in the region can’t begin while Hamas still operates underground. However, with nuclear talks between Iran and the U.S. continuing (as we will discuss in the next section), the question becomes how much of an impact could an agreement between Iran and the U.S. have on the Gaza peace process? Iran appears to be trying to narrow the scope of any agreement with the U.S. to focus on its nuclear program exclusively, but coming to a deal with Iran could put additional pressure on Hamas to lean toward accepting Israel’s demands in order to end the war.

“The situation in Gaza worsened when the ceasefire broke down after phase 1. The IDF has gone back into Gaza and now controls almost 50% of the territory. Their objective is to systematically destroy Hamas and end their rule. The cards are slowly flipping in Israel’s favor with Hamas now supposedly offering to turn over control of Gaza to another Palestinian entity. The Palestinian population in Gaza is slowly turning on Hamas and the group’s terror campaign that they see as squandering their lives and resources and getting nothing in return. Palestinian President Abbas called on Hamas to release the hostages to end the war. Egypt and Qatar are mediating the negotiations and are working on a proposal that would have Hamas disarm and turn over control to another entity. The mediators hope that President Trump’s visit to the Middle East in mid-May will add pressure to reaching a solution. Israel’s objective remains not allowing Hamas to preserve its influence and ability to rearm.” – General Robert Walsh

“Israel and Hamas still have irreconcilable maximalist goals. Hamas wants Israel to end the war and fully withdraw from all parts of Gaza. Israel wants Hamas dead as a governing and military entity. Hamas only has its allegedly 25 living hostages left as negotiating leverage. For now, Israel is holding firm on the destruction of Hamas even as the agony continues over the hostages. It’s hard to see Israel offering anything more than a temporary ceasefire to get some more hostages back, before engaging in another round of destruction. Equally hard to see is Hamas releasing more than a few hostages, as each release reduces its leverage. A U.S.-Iran agreement will have to be truly comprehensive if it deals with anything beyond just the nuclear question.” – General Rick Waddell

“It seems like we’re listening to a broken record with regards to Gaza and the situation is unlikely to improve precipitously. The Trump administration has provided Israel and Netanyahu with maximum latitude to prosecute the offense any way they deem fit. Meanwhile Secretary Rubio is far more focused on achieving a ‘big win’ in Ukraine or with Iran. World opinion coupled with some degree of self-restraint will moderate the Israeli approach, but I am dubious of a long-term ceasefire. Should a 5–7-year deal be reached for the sake of releasing the hostages, I would be surprised if it lasted until Ramadan 2026.” – General John Evans

“A multi-year ceasefire will garner no traction as it will be deemed as not feasible by all parties. Such an extended timeframe would be more akin to restoration of governance and a pathway for resolution of the Palestinian issue, not a ceasefire framework. That being said, resolution of the Palestinian issue remains a non-starter for the current Israeli government under Netanyahu. Israel will continue to occupy portions of Gaza with the explicit intent of hostage recovery and further elimination of Hamas fighters and any residual weapons/capabilities. Recent comments by the Palestinian Authority’s Mahmoud Abbas highlight that patience is waning on all sides. Israel, for all their frustration and lack of trust of Mahmoud Abbas and the PA, needs to consider its options for some form of government or bridging governance framework. To date, Israel has yet to comment on the PA leader’s strong condemnation of Hamas. The lack of pressure by the current U.S. administration only allows the conflict to continue in a direction that supports Netanyahu’s objectives and not those of broader regional constituencies. For now, threat mitigation by Israel means occupation of portions of Gaza.” – General Robert Ashley

“I don’t believe that we can put much weight on or draw correlations to any outcomes if a deal is struck. Although Iran can influence Hamas, I’m not so sure we have the level of influence over Israel that we think we have. We’ve recently seen Putin not listen and do his own thing and I believe when the rubber meets the road Israel will do the same to protect their people for a longer period of time. If Hamas says yes because they are told to, I could see Israel take advantage of the pause (much like Putin did on Easter) to better posture themselves for reducing the threat of future attacks.” – General Brian Cavanaugh

“I do not expect any substantial change in the Israel-Hamas conflict under the current environment. It is difficult to conceive of a formula in which Israel would accept an agreement where Hamas retains a presence in Gaza. Any ceasefire discussions or agreements will be temporary ‘tactical’ maneuvers. A 5-to-7-year ceasefire, in which Gaza remains under Hamas control, will be wholly unacceptable. I do think it is conceivable that, if some agreement – favorable to Israel – is reached with Iran on broader Middle East security issues – Israel might become more flexible in its timeline and conditions for a Gaza resolution. It is not immediately clear to me what form that agreement might take.” – Neil Wiley, Former Principal Executive, Office of the Director of National Intelligence

U.S. and Iran Nuclear Negotiations

On April 12^th, as we reported in our SITREP, Iran and the U.S. resumed in-person indirect and direct nuclear talks for the first time in a decade. Initially, the U.S. position appeared to include a total removal of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, but the strategy shifted into one that would see Iran just giving up its military-focused nuclear efforts, not its civilian program. As U.S. Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi wrapped up the third round of discussions last weekend, the next phase will likely be more difficult as it will focus on the technical negotiations. The key gating item to watch for will be the enrichment of uranium, as Secretary Rubio has repeatedly said that he envisions a scenario where Iran imports uranium for civilian nuclear power use, while Iran insists that its right to enrich uranium is non-negotiable. Other outstanding items in the agreement are Iran’s ballistic missile program and its support of regional terrorism, but it is unclear at this time how those issues will be addressed in any new nuclear deal. The concern is that this potential deal is starting to look more like the 2015 JCPOA, which was determined to be insufficient/ineffective in stopping Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon. The U.S. has reserved the right to use military force in Iran if a deal is not completed, and even as all parties appear to be optimistic on the progress, there are still many items yet to be negotiated before a suitable deal is complete.

“While warnings have come from President Trump threatening military strikes in the event that there is no nuclear deal, the Trump negotiating team said the meetings on Saturday in Oman were ‘positive and productive.’ Trump said on Friday that he believes a nuclear deal is possible. The challenge is how to constrain Iran’s nuclear program and provide sanctions relief. This was the third meeting, and it took a step in the right direction by involving technical teams. The obstacle is that Iran insists on enriching its own nuclear fuel while U.S. Secretary of State Rubio said they can proceed with a civilian nuclear program if it imports the nuclear fuel. Additionally, the U.S. also demands that the deal must include limits on Iran’s missile program (that Iran says is non-negotiable given the threat from Israel). Iran is willing to negotiate because of its struggling economy and needed sanctions relief. There seems to be growing support for the negotiations from Iran’s elite and its conservative media. While the U.S. is leading the bilateral negotiations, Iran has lined up support from Russia and China and is sending representatives to Europe to meet with France, Germany, and the UK. It was a huge step for the two countries to resume nuclear talks.” – General Robert Walsh

“National Security Adviser Waltz stated that the Iranian nuclear program must end. However, Special Envoy Witkoff has implied that Iran could keep enrichment capability at the 3.76% level. Secretary Rubio has recently said that Iran could continue peaceful civil nuclear use by importing enriched uranium without enrichment capability. These are three very different positions. Some critics have pointed out that leaving Iran with sanctions relief, a store of 3.76% enriched material, and thousands of centrifuges in exchange for promises of only peaceful pursuits for some limited period of time, is the Obama JCPOA reborn. Left out of the original JCPOA was any restraint on Iranian missile development or support for terrorism. So early in the negotiations, it’s hard to discern if such constraints are on the table this time.” – General Rick Waddell

“The nuclear deal with Iran is starting to look strangely reminiscent of JCPOA with regard to Iran’s demands to continue to refine uranium for energy purposes. The first Trump administration exited that agreement, saying it was a ‘bad deal.’ The original agreement was signed in April 2015 and here we stand 10 years later (ostensibly when it would have expired) facing virtually the same circumstances. The difference now is that Iran is in a far weaker economic position despite oil being $10+ a barrel higher than it was in 2015. The Iranians can use the purse strings to coerce Hamas to accept more concessions on a longer-term ceasefire should that leverage become an objective of the U.S. delegation for any nuclear agreement, but I’m still dubious about its efficacy long-term.” – General John Evans

“There are obvious parallels between what we need to demonstrate through our efforts against the Iran-backed Houthis and Israel/Hamas/Hezbollah. My assessment after candid conversations is that stakeholders are pleasantly (albeit privately) surprised with our efforts to date against the Houthis. Because of this, we have garnered cooperation and some significant support. This largely informs my conclusion that there is a high degree of confidence in CENTCOM and our efforts at the high-tactical and operational levels of war and there is also decreased anxiety about perceived volatility at the DOD and administration levels regarding our ‘strategic’ objectives.” – General David Bellon

“I get the sense that there is a desire on all sides of this issue to reach an agreement. Whether an agreement can be shaped which sufficiently satisfies all parties is another question altogether. The central issue for the U.S. and Israel will be the assurance that the Iranian nuclear weapons program cannot be reconstituted. Ideally, any agreement would include the comprehensive and verifiable dismantling of Iran’s uranium enrichment program – a tall diplomatic order. An agreement under which Iran retains an enrichment capability will only be viable with a very intrusive inspection program carried out by parties other than the IAEA – conditions which Iran is also unlikely to accept. Without the dismantling of Iran’s enrichment capability or including a satisfactory inspection regime, we will be stuck in the same nuclear weapon breakout-threshold ‘cat and mouse game’ that we are in now. Getting a viable nuclear program agreement will be challenging enough. I do not expect discussions at this point will extend beyond that to address conventional weapons or proxy support.” – Neil Wiley, Former Principal Executive, Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Ukraine Ceasefire Discussions

After more than 3 years of fighting in Ukraine, we are still no closer to a ceasefire that could lead to an end of the war. Even as President Trump has said that both sides “are very close to a deal,” the sentiment coming from Zelensky is that this is not the case. The U.S. proposal includes American legal acceptance of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and recognition of Russian control of other occupied areas, including all of the Luhansk region. It also rules out NATO membership for Ukraine. Official Russian ownership of Crimea will be a very difficult issue for Zelensky to agree to politically, even though he admits that he does not have the military capability to take it back. The U.S. has said that it is putting pressure on all parties to get to a deal, but its patience is wearing thin, so the question becomes what will happen to Ukrainian support if the U.S. ends its involvement in the negotiations? If the U.S. pulls back on military aid, the EU will be responsible for supporting Ukraine (but their supplies are running low in certain key areas such as long-range cruise missiles). If there is no ceasefire in the near-term, we could see this conflict continue for the rest of the year, or longer.

“In war it is sometimes easier to keep fighting than accept the potential risks in a negotiated peace settlement. Neither Ukraine nor Russia are rushing to negotiate a peace settlement. President Trump remains committed to ending the most brutal and largest war in Europe since World War II. Trump’s pressure has brought both sides to the negotiating table, but the two sides are far from ending it. This week will be critical in the negotiations, as Trump (who has recently expressed deep frustration with President Zelensky over his reluctance to concede territory) is now turning on President Putin for the first time. Trump said over the weekend that Putin was ‘tapping him along’ as he continued the brutal Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukraine and its people. Secretary of State Rubio said on Saturday that ‘we’re close, but we’re not close enough’ and warned that the U.S. could still ‘depart the pattern’ if the two sides cannot make concessions. The photo of Presidents Trump and Zelensky sitting kneecap to kneecap at St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome sent a clear message to the world regarding how serious Trump is about ending the war. Reports said Trump was adamant that they meet before Pope Francis’ funeral. The U.S. plan freezes the front lines with Ukraine and concedes Crimea to Russia. Both Ukraine and Russia are pointing fingers at each other, with Zelensky accusing Russia of failing to deescalate the war and Russia accusing Zelensky of refusing to accept the official loss of Crimea. Zelensky now seems willing to compromise and meet Trump’s demands, or risk losing U.S. support. Putin seems far from any concessions. The ball now seems to be in Putin’s court with Trump’s new pressure to impose additional sanctions or negotiate.” – General Robert Walsh

“President Zelensky says that he is ready for a final ceasefire or even limited ceasefires. Putin has stated redlines -Ukraine never gets into NATO, and Russia keeps its conquests. These facts remain: neither Ukraine nor Russia can dictate terms on the battlefield under current conditions and the U.S. has substantial leverage over Zelensky through control of military aid and intelligence sharing, but can really only offer sanctions relief and recognition of territorial conquests to Putin. If at some point the U.S. walks away from negotiations, the Europeans will be left supporting Ukraine on their own. In almost any scenario, the war grinds on for some time to come.” – General Rick Waddell

“I think the Trump administration is looking for the ‘win’ on Ukraine. While Putin may see his opportunity to press for better terms, it is slowly slipping away. I think he still believes that he controls the political initiative – and he realistically does. Putin has used the softer U.S. rhetoric to advance his vicious offensive game in the way that we are all familiar with – false flags, false ceasefires, and attacks on civilian targets. Without a significant shift in our policy, I believe he will press attacks through the summer and hope that subjecting Ukraine to another brutal winter will lead to more Russian concessions.” – General John Evans

“It remains difficult to see a pathway to peace in 2025. Putin’s escalation of hostilities (and fighting while talking) is not new, and is clearly a sign of his intent to continue the war and push Ukraine closer to agreement on the U.S. position of freezing the conflict in place. One factor, which may bring Russia to an agreement, is that Putin’s wartime economy is not sustainable in the long-term. Russian GDP growth has created a façade of stability, yet inflation grows, and interest rates remain high. Other factors putting pressure on Putin will be a 15% decrease in projected oil revenues, a labor shortage estimated at 2-4 million (exacerbated by conscription and military service), and a robust sovereign wealth fund that has dropped from approximately $120B to $39B. As has been stated, there is strong support for Ukraine in the U.S. and I would not assess that the current administration will abandon it. Irrespective of action in Ukraine proper, there is also the question of Russian hybrid warfare across Europe that the U.S. and NATO must address.” – General Robert Ashley

“Diplomacy is about the art of the possible. Agreements on ‘this’ and recognition of ‘that’ are mechanisms to change present and near circumstances. It is entirely conceivable that the observable terrain holdings can be placed in stasis without being locked in. The Korean peninsula is a decent example. The uncomfortable reality seems to be that the FEBA (Forward Edge of the Battle Area) appears more like the WWI Western Front of 1915-1918. Attrition seems to favor Russia, and Ukraine’s ability to generate and sustain mass is hard. It is too easy to simply ask questions about U.S. support – the real question is what about EU support? The administration suggested that a willingness to accept the reality on the ground was a necessary precondition to end the war. The two belligerents don’t appear to be there yet.” – Admiral TJ White

“I believe that an enduring ceasefire in 2025 is extremely unlikely, absent an unexpected collapse of the Ukrainian army. Both Russia and Ukraine continue to adhere to war aims, which are so far apart that narrowing their respective differences appears impossible under current conditions. Russia continues to demand a Ukrainian withdrawal from the four regions ‘annexed’ by Russia in 2022, and a comprehensive resolution to what it refers to as the ‘root causes’ of the conflict including Ukraine’s future alignment, size of the residual Ukrainian military, and protections for the Russian-speaking population and the Russian Orthodox Church, before implementing any enduring ceasefire. Ukraine demands the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all pre-2014 Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, and requires an unconditional ceasefire before any comprehensive negotiations can begin. The conflict is frequently referred to as a ‘stalemate’ in which neither side can militarily achieve its objectives. I don’t think that is an accurate characterization and, more importantly, neither do the Russians. The war is, indeed, a slow-motion attritional grind, but it has a trajectory which increasingly favors Russia. The greatest question for 2025 is whether or not the U.S. will continue its economic and military support for Ukraine. While President Trump’s instincts, and those of many in his administration, may well be to disengage from a conflict which is heading in a decidedly bad direction, it may be difficult to do so. There is still significant congressional support for Ukraine. The Europeans remain implacably hostile to any agreement which ‘rewards’ Russia, despite having little ability to materially alter the conflict. The Europeans will not make peace and cannot make war. It is, therefore, vital to the interests of the Europeans, Ukraine, and their supporters within the U.S. to keep the United States involved in the conflict, and they will exert whatever influence they can to ensure it.” – Neil Wiley, Former Principal Executive, Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Tensions with China Continue

As we have addressed in our previous ATWs and podcasts, we continue to monitor tensions between China and its neighbors. Over the weekend, as 17,000 personnel from the U.S. and the Philippines prepared to take part in the annual Balikatan military exercises, the Chinese Coast Guard seized a tiny sandbank in the Spratly Islands. Sandy Cay is near a Philippine military outpost on Thitu Island, which is used to track Chinese movements in the area. This regional tension comes at a time when the trade war with China rages on. However, while we wait for China to engage with the U.S. (or vice versa) on opening the dialogue, the U.S. has been actively pursuing trade negotiations with our partners in Asia including Japan and South Korea. Discussions have also begun with India, another key member of the QUAD. In addition, the U.S. is looking to expand its access to critical minerals following China’s export controls announcement earlier this month. As we will discuss in the next section, the U.S. has offered to help resolve the conflict between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in return, the U.S. is looking to sign a deal that would see increased U.S. investment in the country and access to its mining industry that would reduce the DRC’s reliance on China.

“The U.S. – China tariff war has turned global, forcing countries to choose between the U.S., China, or walking a fine line down the middle. China and the U.S. are engaging countries to sway them towards global economic alliances that isolate the other economically and diplomatically. The U.S. approach placed tariffs on all countries with the plan to get them to negotiate tariff reductions and trade imbalances by offering favorable terms if they reduce economic ties with China. The increasing number of countries willing to negotiate with the U.S. is a sign of U.S. leverage. China is warning countries against aligning with the U.S. trade isolation efforts and threatening them with their own economic backlash. China’s intense pressure was highlighted by President Xi Jinping traveling outside of China for the first time this year to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia to emphasize regional economic integration and stability as ‘global protectionism and unilateralism continue to mount.’ Both sides increased the trade war through non-tariff means, with China imposing export restrictions on critical minerals and the U.S. imposing fees on Chinese- built vessels entering U.S. ports. There are signs of de-escalation, as both sides have said that further tariff increases would be meaningless, and President Trump has repeatedly said he is willing to make a deal. It may take the U.S. and Chinese economies feeling the effects of the tariffs and trade restrictions to be willing to sit down and seriously negotiate. While Trump appears willing to negotiate now, China seems willing to hunker down for a long struggle as they feel they are more willing and able to absorb the pain.” – General Robert Walsh

“For many in the administration, China’s unfair trade practices are the root cause of the economic and security problems. China has warned other countries not to give in to U.S. pressure, but India announced a 12% tariff on Chinese steel during the VPOTUS visit to India last week. Japan is already in talks with the U.S. on a trade deal. For Australia, Japan, South Korea, India, et al., they have to balance their robust trade with China against the economic and security benefits that they get from the U.S., and the perceived military threat they see from China. It remains to be seen whether the tariff war hurts the Chinese export economy more than the U.S. import economy. As one former SecState put it, the U.S. can win a trade war, but all sides will suffer casualties. The Chinese admission that they were behind Volt Typhoon – a statement of the rather obvious – was a reminder that they have other cards to play at their time and place of choosing.” – General Rick Waddell

“China’s tactics continue to involve their ‘Maritime Militia,’ which operates in the ‘gray zone’ of warfare, and is focused on the disruption of Taiwan’s ‘information enterprise’ by honing their ability to cut the data cables that feed information to the island. Cables like this also support U.S. islands like Guam and Hawaii, while also feeding the U.S. mainland. They generally carry over 95% of the data that we consume. They are critical to intelligence operations and military coordination. The phrase ‘digital resilience’ is creeping into our lexicon, and we must bolster Taiwan’s capability and our own means to find the needed bandwidth if deterrence efforts fail and China’s cable cutting campaign is able to attack the network of undersea cables in the Pacific. Additional bandwidth would probably come from networks of low Earth orbit and medium Earth orbit satellites. After two cables were cut earlier this year feeding Taiwan’s Matsu Islands, residents were forced to rely on microwave transmission systems that offered limited and unreliable internet access.” – Admiral Mark Heinrich

“From the military side you can expect to hear about continued U.S. military equipment/weapons modernization procurement announcements from Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia. The focus is on multi-domain operations and the security provided by buying U.S. or QUAD technology for protection, interoperability, interdependence, intelligence, and information sharing. We need to focus on building trust in the INDO-PACOM region, as this will be the most consequential year for solidifying our relationships with our allies and partners to counter China’s economic threats and the tensions over tariffs.” – General KK Chinn

“I think it is unlikely that the current tariff tension will escalate into a more serious conflict. The incentives for both sides to deescalate tensions are significant. In addition, Xi has recently removed or reassigned key members of the Central Military Commission and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), suggesting that he is either uncomfortable with the state of the People’s Liberation Army or, perhaps, the loyalty of his subordinates. His confidence, then, in the outcome of some kind of escalation may not be high. A key indicator of the potential for escalation may be the domestic standing of the CCP, whose paramount objective is to retain its position as the political and ideological authority in the PRC. If the CCP is seen as weak or ineffective, its legitimacy is damaged, and its control is potentially weakened. Increased domestic criticism of the CCP during a period of tension may drive Xi to risk escalation despite reservations as to the outcome. The PRC has a number of ‘signaling’ mechanisms available to it beyond tariff increases. It could, for example, restrict access to key defense-related materials. To which end, the PRC already placed an additional seven categories of medium and heavy rare earths, available almost exclusively through the PRC, under export control as of April 4th. More aggressive, and less likely, escalatory measures could include overt cyber intrusions, heightened military exercise activity, or deniable disruption of seabed communications infrastructure.” – Neil Wiley, Former Principal Executive, Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

This year, M23 fighters captured the two largest cities in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The rapid offensive left thousands dead, forced hundreds of thousands more from their homes, and raised fears of a wider regional conflict. In January, M23 seized Goma, the largest city in the North Kivu province. Within three weeks, they also captured Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu. The rebel group has also taken control of Walikale, the country’s fourth-largest city and a significant mining hub. The government deployed an army made up of regional forces from Burundi, South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania to combat the M23 forces. M23 said that its primary objective is to fight Hutu extremist groups responsible for the Rwandan genocide. President Félix Tshisekedi proposed a deal to President Trump recently, offering mining opportunities in exchange for assistance. Then, late last week, the government of the DRC and Rwanda-backed M23 rebels agreed to pause fighting as they work towards a broader peace deal in early May. We will have to see if this cessation of hostilities holds long enough to allow the parties to work through a deal that would end the fighting.

“Last week the U.S. brokered a significant peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda. The deal marked an important breakthrough in easing tensions and raised the likelihood of a marked de-escalation of fighting in eastern Congo. The U.S. is choosing this multi-faceted strategy in a region that has been largely ignored by the U.S. for years because of the critical minerals involved and the larger strategic economic competition with China. Both the Congo and Rwanda hope to gain U.S. security support and economic development through U.S. companies engaging in the mining sector that includes multibillion-dollar investments.” – General Robert Walsh

“The U.S. has had low involvement in the DRC in the past, so engagement here is interesting (but not surprising) since part of the consideration regarding a potential deal for minerals (DRC is Africa’s largest copper producer & the world’s largest cobalt producer) included the return of three American citizens to serve their life sentence in the U.S. M23 controls the mining areas in the east, next to Rwanda. However, the most mineral-rich area is in southern DRC and M23 is threatening to take it next. There is an opportunity for U.S. backing of the DRC government which could increase the potential attraction of foreign investment as our backing of the current government provides some political stability. Big picture in Africa is that China is winning, but Africa is so big that there are still plenty of opportunities. It will be of interest to see what the final deal/agreement is with the DRC as it will become a model of possibilities for future U.S. agreements in Africa.” – General KK Chinn

“The entire continent of Africa had been ignored for decades by the U.S., and China has filled that gap. The resources on the continent aren’t new and if our nation had a more strategic view, we would have been there decades ago. Having said that, it’s not too late to start. I’m concerned that our dismantling of certain agencies don’t help in building partner capacity and setting conditions to be able to have the much-needed relationships to make deals for things that would be mutually beneficial (minerals, food etc.).” – General Brian Cavanaugh

“There have been about half a dozen truces and ceasefires since 2021. That being said, the signing on 25 April of a declaration of principles at the U.S. State Department by DRC and Rwandan officials is a significant boost to the possibility of greater stability. The document outlines a pathway to peace and integrated economic development, which are necessary to ending the conflict. U.S. diplomatic engagement and discussion with both countries about mineral extraction are positive steps forward, and are surely not welcome events in Beijing.” – Linda Weissgold, Former CIA Deputy Director for Analysis

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