Around the World with Academy Securities
In this month’s edition of Around the World with Academy Securities, our Geopolitical Intelligence Group (GIG) focuses on the following geopolitical tensions that we are monitoring:
- Israel Returns to War in Gaza
- U.S. Strikes the Houthis in Yemen
- Ukraine Ceasefire Negotiations
- Chinese Military Exercises Around Taiwan
We begin this month’s ATW with an update on the fighting in Gaza which commenced once again following the lack of engagement by Hamas regarding the extension of the ceasefire into April. The IDF began with airstrikes in Gaza last week and is now conducting targeted ground operations aimed at key Hamas leadership and infrastructure targets. In the past week since these operations began, there have also been reports of rockets being fired once again into Israel from Lebanon (though Hezbollah has denied involvement) and ballistic missiles being launched by the Houthis at Israel. While the combination of these events is concerning, we will have to see what kind of an impact the warnings from the Trump administration will have on Iran to hold them responsible for the actions of their proxy forces. We also address the U.S. strikes on Houthi leadership and weapons facilities in Yemen which commenced after the Houthis signaled that they would begin firing at commercial shipping and Israeli targets once again. Next, we report on the ceasefire discussions regarding the war in Ukraine, where negotiations resulted in a limited energy infrastructure ceasefire last week and an agreement to stop fighting in the Black Sea this week. We will also address the Chinese military exercises around Taiwan last week and the fact that these exercises are becoming more routine. Finally, our GIG is keeping an eye on the protests in Turkey, where on Sunday, tens of thousands of opposition supporters gathered outside Istanbul city hall to protest the arrest of the city’s mayor (a key rival to Turkish President Erdogan in the 2028 election) on corruption charges.
Please reach out to your Academy coverage officer with any questions and we would be happy to engage.
Front and Center: Israel Returns to War in Gaza
As we addressed in our previous SITREP, on March 18th, Israel returned to war in Gaza with airstrikes targeting senior Hamas leadership. In addition, a few days later, the IDF launched a “targeted ground operation” against Hamas infrastructure and weapons sites. As we reported in the February ATW, the negotiations for the second phase of the ceasefire never really gained any momentum and Hamas once again “emerged from the tunnels defiant” during every single hostage return ceremony during phase one. In an effort to give the parties additional time to negotiate, U.S. special envoy to the Mideast Steve Witkoff proposed a bridge agreement would have extended the ceasefire through April 19th and included the release of five living hostages in exchange for a much larger number of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. Hamas then delayed and announced a counter-offer that was deemed to be a “non-starter.” This chain of events eventually led to the decision that Hamas is not negotiating in good faith and the only way to get them back to the table to discuss a “reasonable” path forward was for the IDF to commence military operations in Gaza once again. In addition, rockets were fired into Israel from Lebanon over the weekend from Hezbollah-linked areas and the IDF responded with airstrikes. While Hezbollah denied involvement, this was the first official exchange of fire since the ceasefire was entered into last November. Finally, the Houthis resumed firing ballistic missiles at Israel last week following the return to fighting in Gaza. While these missiles were intercepted, the engagement on all three fronts is concerning and likely meant to be a show of solidarity among the proxy forces, which are all backed by Iran. However, as we will address in the next section, with the U.S. stepping up its strikes against the Houthis in Yemen, the message is being delivered to Iran that support for its proxy forces must stop, or they will face consequences.
“Last week’s Israeli airstrikes effectively ended the ceasefire agreement and forced a negotiation reset. The airstrikes occurred after Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s Middle East envoy, tried to negotiate a bridging agreement that would extend phase one of the treaty. Hamas refused the offer. President Trump was informed beforehand and approved of the airstrikes. Israel’s new operation ‘Strength and Sword’ is aimed at pressuring Hamas to release more hostages, lay down their arms, and leave Gaza. The IDF will escalate and deescalate their military operations until they meet their objectives. The goal is to put pressure on the Palestinian population in Gaza to reject the Hamas leadership. Israel’s Defense Minister Katz said that the IDF will seize new areas in Gaza while evacuating the population. He further said that Israel will annex them if Hamas does not release more hostages. This is a new negotiating tool to trade territory for hostages. The war ending strategy extends past releasing the remaining hostages to the rejection of Hamas by the Palestinian people (and the Arab states) and their expulsion from Gaza.” – General Robert Walsh
“Israel has long described its periodic counter-terror operations as ‘mowing the grass’ whenever the various terrorist groups grow too strong. When this happens, Israel launches a series of operations that reduces the terrorists’ lethal capacity and seeks to restore some level of deterrence. The resumption of the Israeli operations in Gaza could be seen in this light. Israel will take this opportunity to strike Gaza, perhaps using the ‘bunker buster’ munitions that the Trump administration recently delivered. Meanwhile, Israel and the U.S. will continue to negotiate with Hamas for the release of the remaining living hostages and the bodies of the murdered hostages. Since Israel seeks the end of Hamas as a governing and military organization, and Hamas seeks a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and an end to all Israeli military operations, negotiations are nowhere near completion.” – General Rick Waddell
“Hamas continues to do what Hamas does best – delay and hedge. The reality is, without significant and sustained financing and military reinforcement from Iran, their bluff is not nearly as strong, and Israel is willing to call their hand at every turn. While Iran is not completely without ability to reinforce Hamas efforts through their illicit networks built and matured over decades, their position is increasingly tenuous. World opinion and pressure from allies will not long hold Netanyahu in check. The hostages are the last card Hamas has to play and the longer the tensions stretch on, the weaker their hand becomes.” – General John Evans
“Independent of view, there is a clear and consistent trendline of Hamas slow-rolling negotiations – whether participating in or complying with – and an apparent unwillingness to change conditions on the ground to bring a lasting stability (whether détente or simple security objectives). Circumstances have materially changed on the global stage and any firm linkages between Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis as proxies for Iran appear increasingly thin and frail. It will be interesting to see how the U.S. approaches the (evidently) sole remaining American hostage. Bottom line: Israel/Gaza is becoming less about Hamas and increasingly more about regional roles and responsibilities. Countries in the region have a historical opportunity to step on the playing field and shape their organic futures as never before.” – Admiral TJ White
“The ceasefire is effectively over. The Israeli government has been emboldened by U.S. support and is now showing little interest in anything other than the complete elimination of Hamas and is doing so in Gaza. This is gaining tacit support from Gulf states who can see that the best way to achieve their objectives is to work as closely as they can with the U.S., ultimately working back towards something that looks like the Abraham Accords. The use of Saudi Arabia as the base for Ukrainian peace talks is part of the influence effort, playing to the Crown Prince’s wider aspirations to achieve greater global endorsement. This may bring peace in the near-term, but ethically it will increasingly be challenged by some in Europe, and it will not resolve the Palestinian problem.” – General Sir Nick Parker
“We should listen carefully to what the Israeli government is saying about next steps, as they have been doing exactly what they say they will do. They clearly signaled (earlier this month) the decision to cut off electricity, restart airstrikes and ground operations, and to move to reoccupy the Netzarim corridor, which bisects Gaza. Israel’s Defense Minister said last week that as long as Hamas continues its refusal to turn over hostages, ‘it will lose more and more land that will be added to Israel.’ This suggests that Israel is considering taking permanent control of the territory, probably in the form of allowing the return of Israeli settlers that the Sharon government forced to leave in 2005. They know that they cannot afford to let their guard down. Hamas and the Houthis will continue to attack Israel as long as they possibly can. Reporting suggests that Hamas is running low on rockets, with some Arab intelligence officials now saying that they believe Hamas may just have 10 to 15 percent of the 20,000 projectiles it had in October 2023. The Houthis are still shooting missiles at Israel, but its resupply almost certainly has slowed. Strikes from Gaza and Yemen may be less frequent, but we all know that it only takes one rocket or missile hitting a school or retirement home to ratchet up the war immediately. Deterrence, whether for the Houthis or Hamas, will require sustained pressure. The U.S. decision to move a second carrier group to the region helps demonstrate this resolve.” – Linda Weissgold, Former CIA Deputy Director for Analysis
U.S. Strikes the Houthis in Yemen
On March 15th, as we reported in our SITREP, the U.S. began conducting broader strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. These strikes came as the Houthis started making threats once again about targeting shipping in the Red Sea (and Israel itself) in response to the IDF blockade around Gaza. U.S. air and naval assets in the region have been conducting intermittent strikes for the past 10 days with the goal of taking out key Houthi leadership (including their head missileer), weapons facilities, and communications infrastructure. It is important to note that when these strikes began, President Trump announced that the U.S. would now hold Iran directly responsible for any further Houthi attacks on shipping, U.S. forces in the region, or Israel, which is a thinly veiled threat to Iran to end the support of its proxy forces. The hope is that this increased pressure will encourage Iran to commence discussions with the U.S. directly regarding its nuclear and ballistic missile programs as well as its support of regional terrorism.
“President Trump is taking a proactive and more hawkish stance in comparison to President Biden’s Iran policy. His ‘Peace through Strength’ foreign affairs approach frames diplomacy first with a willingness to back it up with military power. His letter to Ayatollah Khamenei gave a two-month deadline to get to a deal on Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Trump has been clear that Iran cannot have a bomb, and he would rather solve the problem diplomatically but is ‘willing to take the next steps if necessary.’ The recent U.S. airstrikes on Houthi military leadership and infrastructure came after the Houthis said that they would resume their blockade in the Red Sea to show solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza. President Trump responded that ‘all hell would rain down’ while he vowed to hold Iran accountable for its proxy ally. In January, Trump signed an executive order designating the Houthis as a terrorist organization. He is also moving a second aircraft carrier to the Middle East. Iran’s Supreme Leader responded to the U.S. attacks by saying that the Houthis are an independent organization, dismissing U.S. claims of Iranian control. The statement comes after years of Iran describing the Houthi alignment as part of its ‘Axis of Resistance’ to Israel and U.S. influence. A U.S. campaign against the Houthis could lead to expanding attacks to Iranian ships and advisors that are providing the Houthis with military support. Continued escalations by the U.S. against the Houthis could raise economic risk to oil and gas markets.” – General Robert Walsh
“The Houthis fundamentally depend on international humanitarian aid for food, medicine, and fuel. The Houthis also fundamentally depend on Iranian arms shipments. This gives the Trump administration several avenues to constrain the Houthis. Kinetic strikes against Houthi leadership and critical military assets might be necessary, but are not sufficient to convince the Houthis to cease their attacks on Red Sea shipping. Calling out the Iranians for their obvious support to the Houthis is simply stating the obvious. The critical question is how the Trump administration thwarts the overland and seaborne deliveries of Iranian aid to the Houthis as part of the broader ‘maximum pressure campaign’ to convince the Iranians to enter broader negotiations covering their nuclear threat, their ballistic missiles, and their proxy forces.” – General Rick Waddell
“The strongest element in Iran’s regional influence portfolio remains the zealot Houthis in Yemen. At over 350,000 strong, they are a more significant and dedicated force than much of the world would acknowledge. Their networks are surprisingly resilient, and their geographic proximity (coupled with short sea routes) allows Iran to sustain them in a far better manner than they are supporting Hamas and Hezbollah. To a great degree, the fall of the Assad regime has allowed Iran to refocus its efforts and resources on the Yemen conflict in hopes of achieving a strategically significant strike in the region (sinking or heavily damaging a U.S. warship). The recent attempts to strike the USS Harry Truman demonstrate that the Houthis are unrepentant in their commitment to strike the U.S. The significant U.S./allied strikes of the past week will dampen their enthusiasm, but only temporarily. Look for USCENTCOM to continue to ramp up pressure on the Houthis to keep Iran in check.” – General John Evans
“The Houthis have shown tremendous resilience over the years during ground combat operations against the UAE and the KSA. While Iran supports the Houthis with weapons and other technology, the Houthis remain a semi-autonomous entity. IDF combat operations against Hamas in Gaza will likely remain the driving factor for Houthi strikes against the U.S. and international commercial shipping. Deterring the Houthis remains problematic, short of an extensive sustained campaign. However, strikes against civilian Houthi leadership are a marked escalation by the U.S. However, it is unlikely to lead to a cessation of hostilities or sustained deterrence. I would not assess the Houthis’ actions as a reason for the U.S. to launch a kinetic strike against Iran, but rather for it to serve as the impetus for increased Iranian sanctions. Getting Iran to the table is less a function of the relationships with or actions by their proxies, but rather it will be driven by engagement between the U.S. and Iran related to their nuclear weapons program.” – General Robert Ashley
“The Houthis are well-armed and fearless in their continued disruption of global trade. The Houthis have been masterful at operating without a clear benefactor (there are several). The risk of a humanitarian disaster (or worse) still stays the hand of those who would ratchet up generalized strikes against Houthi assets (other than missiles). Playing ‘whack-a-mole’ with Houthi missiles is a time-consuming and dangerous methodology. Extended Houthi global power projection has been minimal, but a breakout of Houthi capability to other places might create further disruption. Outside of the current airstrikes, POTUS is not likely to commit to escalated U.S. military forces in the near-term.” – General Michael Groen
Ukraine Ceasefire Negotiations
After 3 years of war in Ukraine, discussions continue to determine the path that will hopefully end the war. Last week, President Trump spoke with President Putin and the two leaders agreed upon a limited 30-day ceasefire (also supported by Ukraine) that applies to critical energy infrastructure. There was also news today about an agreement to stop fighting in the Black Sea. However, the concern is that Putin avoided making additional concessions in order to stall for time to allow Russian troops to advance in eastern Ukraine. Zelensky has made it known that he is still open to a deal proposed by the U.S. that would lead to a comprehensive ceasefire, but Putin has rejected that approach saying that this would be conditioned on the halting of arms shipments to Kyiv and a suspension of Ukraine’s military mobilization, provisions which have been rejected by both Ukraine and its western allies. In addition to the talks, the issue at hand now is what will be required for Ukraine and the U.S. to sign a critical minerals deal that will effectively be a commercial agreement that will intertwine U.S. and Ukrainian interests in a way that, in theory, could deter future Russian military action in the country. With Trump signing an Executive Order to boost American mineral production last week, which will utilize the Defense Production Act, it is clear that U.S. interest in these minerals is critical to national security, and steps are being taken by this administration to ensure that the U.S. has access to what it needs, especially as China continues to put restrictions on certain exports.
“President Trump and President Putin agreed to a limited ceasefire during last week’s call, but attached additional conditions that delayed the chance for a full ceasefire. The call shifted discussion from Ukraine to broader measures such as arms control and stability in other regions such as the Middle East. President Trump’s actions create the first real opportunity to end the war and more broadly he seeks to restore relations with Russia that fell to their lowest level since the end of the Cold War. The concern from Ukraine and the Europeans is the new Trump-Putin discussions could lead to a decoupling from the Ukraine ceasefire talks putting Ukraine at risk by becoming a small piece in the broader negotiations. Putin has significant negotiating leverage over Ukraine which he will probably use to drag out the ceasefire talks over his demands around Western military support, peacekeeping forces, Ukraine’s NATO membership, and changing borders. The call’s agreement to cease attacks on energy infrastructure is a first step but is far from ending the shooting. This week’s meetings in Saudi Arabia are focused on next steps to include further air and Black Sea deconfliction details and working towards an interim ceasefire. Continuing negotiations with Russia may be distressing, but they are necessary to end the war.” – General Robert Walsh
“Putin is likely to continue to seek incremental gains in eastern Ukraine as negotiations continue. It is unclear what additional economic sanctions could be applied to Russia that would suddenly be more effective than the sanctions used since 2014. Similarly, to be effective as pressure on Russia to enter negotiations, providing more military aid to Ukraine will still require Ukraine to raise and train sufficient manpower. Neither additional sanctions on Russia nor additional military aid to Ukraine is likely to happen quickly enough to produce the desired results.” – General Rick Waddell
“Putin continues to hold out for ‘best terms’ on a ceasefire. Still, the opening of the aperture between the U.S. and Ukraine and the ‘unofficial’ talks this week in Saudi Arabia between Ukraine and Russia at the behest of the U.S. indicate that Putin may have reached the limit of his influence. Largely hidden in the press are the significant pressures Russia faces including spiraling interest rates, manufacture/manpower shortages, healthcare shortages (over 160 hospitals in Russia have closed or are failing), military desertions, etc. The clock is ticking louder for Putin than most realize, and this will bring him to the table and encourage concessions (though it is hard to distill when and what those will be). Russia does not demonstrate the patience of the Chinese, but 20 years in power has taught Putin the value of the long game – South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Crimea, the Donbas – stop the military offensive when penalties become too high, consolidate gains, seek an enduring presence under the guise of peacekeeping, and wait to fight another day.” – General John Evans
“Things are not going well for Ukraine. Having been forced to accept ceasefire terms or risk losing the support of their most powerful ally, they now have to wait while the Russians prevaricate. The cards in their hand are being strengthened to an extent by the continuing commitment of funding from European nations, attempts to build a ‘coalition of the willing’ to provide a force that will underwrite future security in some form, and more talk of strengthening sanctions. But these are unlikely to shift the balance of power sufficiently to bring a satisfactory conclusion. The initiative appears to be with Russia, who is setting conditions for a ceasefire that do not reflect their position as the aggressor. They are being emboldened by the mixed messaging coming out of the U.S. administration. It is becoming clear that the U.S. will not provide a security guarantee, and is only likely to provide economic support if there are commensurate benefits. The concept of deterring further aggression by developing active U.S. commercial participation in mines and nuclear power plants is unlikely to be a game changer, particularly without some formal commitment to the sovereignty of Ukraine. Key will be the tolerance for further delay and evasion as the ceasefire talks continue. If the U.S. is able to demonstrate that they have red lines or limited patience, which can be used to apply pressure, then there is a chance of progress. Without this, the conflict and wider instability in Eastern Europe still has a long way to run.” – General Sir Nick Parker
“A broad coalition of countries—including the EU, the UK, and the U.S.—continues to uphold and, in some areas, strengthen the economic sanctions, demonstrably impacting the Russian economy through rising inflation, a weakened ruble, and strains on various sectors, including energy, finance, and the military-industrial complex. The U.S., under the Trump administration, has largely maintained existing sanctions, prioritizing a ceasefire and considering potential future relief. The EU’s recent 16th sanctions package reflects ongoing efforts to tighten restrictions and close off pathways for sanctions evasion. The UK also maintains a strong enforcement posture, signaling continued resolve. Despite widespread enforcement, Russia relies on China, India, Turkey and others to circumvent sanctions, which may be giving Putin time to make territorial gains in Ukraine prior to agreeing to a ceasefire.” – General Mary O’Brien
Chinese Military Exercises Around Taiwan
As we have addressed in our previous ATWs and podcasts, we continue to monitor tensions between China and Taiwan. Last week, following a speech by Taiwanese President Lai where he proclaimed that Taiwanese law designates mainland China as a “foreign hostile force,” China launched yet another set of military exercises off Taiwan including ships and aircraft (with 43 entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone). While there were no direct confrontations with Taiwanese forces during these latest Chinese operations, these exercises continue to become more frequent and demonstrate broader Chinese capabilities. In October of last year, China successfully executed a simulated blockade of Taiwan, which is concerning on many levels, including how fast it was executed and how it showed the interoperability of various platforms including its aircraft carrier in the exercise. While 2027 is the deadline given by Xi for the Chinese military to be ready to successfully commence a military operation against Taiwan, as General Robeson from our team states, “China will find it immensely more challenging to conduct an 80-110 mile amphibious assault across the Strait than was the case in Russia’s land invasion of Ukraine.” In addition, General Marks from our team commented that, “With respect to China, the global economic blowback to an irredentist China would be punishing and unprecedented. How do China and the interdependently connected global economies respond?” All great points to consider as nations “wargame” the precursors to any potential Chinese move on Taiwan and the responses from the rest of the world that would likely include both economic and military measures.
“President Trump and President Xi are planning to meet in the United States soon. President Trump is signaling that he wants a trade deal with President Xi, which is worrying some of the China Hawks that seek a hardline stance. Trump’s tariffs on Chinese goods are not in sync with his comments of having good relations with Xi. He warned that the tariffs are for halting the flow of chemicals used to make illegal fentanyl. At a deeper level he is focused on reducing the trade deficit with China and returning manufacturing jobs to the U.S. China responded by implementing retaliatory tariffs, leaving the two countries in a trade war. No one expects the trade and tech war that Trump started during his first administration to end. While Trump preaches his ‘America First’ policy, China hopes for a more structured economic competition and less of an outright trade war. He clearly wants to right trade imbalances and reduce the chances of global wars. The meeting could build a framework for fair trade relations and stabilize increasing national security risks.” – General Robert Walsh
“China is clearly seeking to regularize the drills off Taiwan. This will train their own forces and increases the risk that Taiwan might become complacent in its response. The Trump administration has chosen to focus first on Russia-Ukraine and U.S. border security. An engagement with China will start with trade, picking up where the first Trump administration left off. The administration will also seek to arm Taiwan through sales in preference to any stated commitment to defend.” – General Rick Waddell
“China is continuing to assess U.S. intentions in INDOPACOM – proceeding with caution but staying the course. From a military perspective it is the one area that the Trump administration and DoD do not want to project weakness. It is also the only area where U.S. flag officer reductions are not being sought. Xi will continue apace of the current plan to challenge Taiwan’s aspirations for increased autonomy both with military exercises and information campaigns. Taiwanese President Lai’s commitment to move defense spending from 2.4 to 3.0% of GDP is welcomed news but falls well short of the Trump administration’s admonition that it should be closer to 10% (an unrealistic number). Complicating Lai’s position is a sino-sympathetic Taiwanese Congress that likes the status quo with the PRC and is fearful of antagonizing them. Expect the U.S. position to remain largely unchanged, and for the administration to continue to use economic levers (tariffs) to apply pressure on an already fragile Chinese export economy which cannot rapidly shift to a consumption economy. As the Trump administration works on a new National Security Strategy (expected to be in the offing later this year), China will feature largely and first among equals (perhaps with no equal at all) in the near-peer competitor category.” – General John Evans
“Trump/Xi engagement is underway and has been since the Inauguration Day comments regarding the Panama Canal. Arguably, they’ve been in active discourse since April 2017 when President Xi visited Mar-a-Lago or during President Trump’s visit to the Korean Peninsula’s DMZ in June of 2019. To be clear, tensions over Taiwan are neither surprising nor new. The CCP has been signaling and demonstrating resolve with increasing volume and clarity. The interesting calculus will be the ongoing assessment of the status of U.S. strategic ambiguity on the matter and commitment to strategic competition.” – Admiral TJ White
“President Xi was outraged at the sale of Hong Kong-owned ports and infrastructure adjacent to the Panama Canal. That was a significant unforced error. Xi’s campaign of cleaning up the party, military, and society are all priority items that he continues to juggle. He does not have the luxury of time, money, or people to achieve the transformation in China that he wants. Americans tend to look at China primarily through our own lenses of trade, technology, and defense. Xi has a lot more problems than we give him ‘credit’ for. One significant new wrinkle is the emerging alignment of South East Asian countries who have come to see the menace that China presents. I expect that we will see greater military cooperation among the Pacific ‘quad’ and other concerned states. This will ‘grow’ if China continues its forceful hand, especially with respect to Taiwan.” – General Michael Groen
“The risk of miscalculation or an accidental military engagement increases as the Chinese become more aggressive in their regional operations. That said, military indicators are but one metric to gauge potential hostilities with China. It is important that we continue to look at China through the lens of all the national instruments of power (DIME) with an emphasis on economics. Xi likely sees Trump’s international policies as an opportunity to fill in the gaps across the globe as Xi presses on expanding the Belt and Road Initiative and providing alternatives to the U.S. Xi is watching Trump and Putin to see how he may gain greater insights into Trump’s decision-making going forward. I would expect Putin and Xi to have limited discussion on the way ahead, but they will not be completely transparent with each other. A key intelligence question will be how well we can assess Xi’s interpretation of Trump and by extension the U.S. willingness to engage on behalf of Taiwan which will factor into Xi’s risk calculus. Xi is likely trying to assess if Trump the businessman sees the cost of defending Taiwan in the U.S. national interest and if it is worth the economic impact.” – General Robert Ashley
“President Trump said last week that President Xi may visit the U.S. ‘in the not-too-distant future.’ Sanctions and Taiwan will undoubtedly be at the top of the list of things that they have to talk about, but one item that hasn’t received as much press as it probably warrants is a meeting that took place in Beijing earlier this month between China, Russia, and Iran. The three countries issued a joint statement on 14 March calling for an end to sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program and supporting Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The meeting came just one week after President Trump revealed that he wrote a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei calling for talks on Iran’s nuclear program and warning of potential military action if Tehran refused. China’s role on the international stage continues to grow in ways that challenge U.S. policy around the globe.” – Linda Weissgold, Former CIA Deputy Director for Analysis
“The first thing that needs to happen for a meeting between President Trump and Xi to occur is for China to lift the sanction on Secretary Rubio, as technically he cannot travel to China since he was sanctioned in 2020. Since Xi attended the APEC Summit in 2023 in San Francisco and met with President Biden, per Chinese protocol, President Trump should visit China next. Don’t expect that to happen; Xi will likely visit first and then President Trump will visit China. President Trump’s goal has not changed from his first term – pressure allies to do more on their own and contribute more to their defense – NATO, Japan, South Korea, etc. As we saw in his first term, allies and partners can always do more, and both Japan and South Korea will bend to the pressure as they both know we need to work together to deter China and North Korea. The risk of war will remain low, but the region will become more unstable as China continues to execute more gray zone activities. In the long-term the U.S. will be there to support our allies and partners.” – General KK Chinn
“The South China Morning Post reported that China revealed for the first time that it has developed a compact deep-sea cable cutting device that is powerful enough to severe communication lines. The tool is able to operate at a depth of up to 4,000 meters (13,123 feet) and has been designed for use with the country’s advanced manned or unmanned submersible vehicles. It’s becoming clear that the gray area of warfare is going to be of increased importance to both China and Russia. Perhaps the first sign of an invasion of Taiwan may very well be an effort to isolate the island via the sabotage of all the electrical and data cables that emanate from Taiwan.” – Admiral Mark Heinrich
