In this month’s edition of Around the World with Academy Securities, our Geopolitical Intelligence Group (GIG) focuses on the following geopolitical tensions that we are monitoring:

1. Israel and Hezbollah Ceasefire
2. Iran-Backed Houthis Continue Attacks in the Red Sea
3. Biden Loosens Restrictions on U.S. Weapons Used in Russia
4. U.S. Reinforces Partnerships in Indo-Pacific to Counter China

We begin this month’s report with an update on the ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hezbollah. On November 26, the Israeli security cabinet approved the deal instituting a cessation of hostilities and a 60-day phased withdrawal of forces. However, Israel reserves the right to strike in Lebanon during this period if they identify any active Hezbollah threats to Israel. Israel has made significant progress in eliminating Hezbollah’s key leadership and destroying much of its military capability. However, time will tell how long this ceasefire actually lasts, as the mechanism to oversee the pause in fighting is the same as the one that ended the 2006 war (UN Security Council Resolution 1701). Next, we revisit the Iran-backed Houthis, as strikes on commercial and coalition Navy shipping in the Red Sea continue. The Trump administration is expected to increase pressure on the Iranian regime, but could leave the door open for discussions around curbing Iran’s growing nuclear program and its support of regional terrorist activities. We also provide an update on the war in Ukraine following the U.S. decision to ease restrictions on the use of long-range weapons inside of Russia. Putin has responded with additional threats and even successfully demonstrated the use of a new intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile. Both sides will be focused on gaining/holding as much territory as possible in advance of any ceasefire discussion in 2025. Finally, we discuss China and the U.S. push to reinforce its partnerships to act as a counterweight and a deterrence mechanism in the region.

Please reach out to your Academy coverage officer with any questions and we would be happy to engage.

Front and Center: Israel and Hezbollah Ceasefire

As we have addressed in our previous ATWs, SITREPs, and podcasts, the IDF has made significant progress in its operations to weaken Hezbollah’s military and political leadership and to destroy the group’s ability to strike throughout Israel. Negotiations have been ongoing for weeks to agree on a deal that would commence a ceasefire in Lebanon that would eventually allow tens of thousands of citizens on both sides of the border with Israel to return to their homes. On November 26, the Israeli security cabinet voted in favor of the agreed upon ceasefire deal with Hezbollah. The proposal outlines a 60-day end to hostilities, but the hope is that this leads to a more permanent truce. However, Netanyahu has stated that he reserves the right to strike Hezbollah targets in Lebanon deemed to be threats to Israel. Both Israel and Lebanon had previously stated that any ceasefire deal should be based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel. The resolution called for the removal of Hezbollah’s fighters and weapons in the 20-mile area between the Lebanon-Israel border and the Litani River. Per the agreement, thousands of Lebanese troops and UN peacekeepers were supposed to enforce the deal. However, this oversight was not effective, and Hezbollah was able to maintain a presence on the border with Israel. There is concern that this will once again not solve the problem. Whether this deal results in a longer truce will depend on whether or not Hezbollah pulls its forces back beyond the Litani River and ceases their attacks on northern Israel. There will also need to be certainty around a more permanent peace before citizens can begin to move back into their homes. Netanyahu stated that a ceasefire will enable Israel to focus on the Iranian threat, give the IDF a break, and to allow the IDF to increase its pressure on Hamas in order to secure the release of the remaining hostages.

“Israel’s phased campaign has been a success. They defeated Hamas, eliminated Hezbollah’s leadership, and greatly diminished their rocket and missile capability. Now they are taking a pause to see how the ceasefire goes while they refit and prepare for what may be next with Iran. Iran pushed Hezbollah to the ceasefire table to stop the bleeding.” – General Robert Walsh

“The challenge for Tehran by making Hezbollah agree to a ceasefire is that Tehran has now become the center of gravity for Israeli military operations. They have created the conditions not for their demise, but for a period of ‘maximum pressure’ from Israel. Of course, we should expect the ceasefire to be temporary and hostilities to resume.” – General Spider Marks

“The ceasefire deal is interesting. A ‘ceasefire’ is not the end of hostilities. The Israelis have reserved the right to retaliate against any projectile coming from Lebanon. It will not likely be very long. The conditions of withdrawal (beyond the Litani River) include the same boundary as in the original UNSCR 1701. That was executed with little oversight. The Lebanese Army does not have the will, firepower, or organization to push back on Hezbollah. Let’s hope it sticks for now until a more comprehensive deal is rooted.” – General Michael Groen

“Exactly…it’s not an end, but a break. However, other negotiations can potentially gain more traction toward a sustained peace if rockets and missiles are not flying. Netanyahu’s statement addressed the progress Israel has made in its major areas of focus. ‘We have set (Hezbollah) back decades, eliminated its top leaders, destroyed most of its rockets and missiles, neutralized thousands of its fighters, and obliterated years of terror infrastructure near our border.’ Netanyahu’s narrative is that they have reached an acceptable threshold from which more meaningful talks can emerge, but Iran and Hezbollah are one strike away from immediate Israeli escalation.” – General Robert Ashley

“The Israelis will not feel secure enough to move back into their communities in the north, so it doesn’t really help with that end state. While this is a tactical pause for both sides, Iran remains the driving force in determining when Hezbollah will attack.” – General Frank Kearney

Iran-Backed Houthis Continue Attacks in the Red Sea

As we have addressed in our ATWs, the Iran-backed Houthi rebels continue to be a major threat to global shipping in the region. In addition, even after several U.S. and coalition strikes against Houthi weapons depots to try to degrade their capabilities, the Houthis have proven to be a durable force that has been and continues to be well-supplied by Iran. However, after yet another attack against two U.S. destroyers this month that was successfully defeated, the time to take more significant action against the Houthis may be fast approaching. The Houthis continue to threaten shipping and coalition Navy forces in the region relatively freely. In addition, it is unclear if the Houthis will cease their attacks in the region or if they will continue to play their part in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” and wage a longer campaign against the West on Iran’s behalf following the end of the conflict in Gaza. Earlier in the month, Iran’s Supreme Leader threatened Israel and the U.S. with a “crushing response” to Israel’s October 26 strikes on Iran. However, after better understanding the impact of the Israeli strikes on their air defense network, Iran has likely decided that its critical infrastructure is too exposed, and they risk a much more significant Israeli response if Iran were to directly strike Israel for a 3^rd time. Iran’s leadership is likely also concerned about the potential actions that could be taken when the Trump administration takes office in January. The threat of enforcement of some existing sanctions (in addition to new ones) may deter Khamenei from acting in the near-term. However, Iran has increased its stockpile of uranium enriched to near weapons-grade levels, according to the IAEA. As of October 26, Iran has 182.3 kilograms (401.9 pounds) of uranium enriched up to 60%, an increase of 17.6 kilograms (38.8 pounds) since the last report in August. Iran will likely continue to pursue additional enrichment activities until the change in U.S. administration occurs in January and could use this progress as leverage to try to negotiate some kind of a deal.

“Both Israel and Iran are feeling the pressure from President-elect Trump’s announcement to Prime Minister Netanyahu that he must end the war in Gaza soon. He also indicated to Iran that he may be interested in dealmaking instead of renewing his maximum pressure campaign. Trump knows the environment has changed with the Gulf Arab states working towards reproachment with Iran instead of confronting them. All of this is putting pressure on Israel to maximize its military gains prior to Trump becoming president. Iran has threatened a third round of strikes in response to Israel’s October 26 strikes on Iranian military sites. Israel has uncovered the weakness in Iran’s military by destroying many of Iran’s Russian-supplied air defense systems. Iran is worried that Israel’s military focus will now turn to them, so they have been reluctant to escalate the situation. Their concern is that Israel will attempt to further degrade Iran’s nuclear facilities, go after their military capabilities, and/or turn to destroying Iran’s oil production and transfer capabilities.” – General Robert Walsh

“The damage done by the recent Israeli strikes helped reestablish deterrence by demonstrating a capability to severely hurt Iran’s nuclear program, its military structure, and its economy, if Iran chooses to continue direct attacks. This makes another direct Iranian strike less likely. However, Iran has decades of experience using proxies to attack Israel. Even with Hamas and Hezbollah severely degraded, Iran will use them as much as possible. The same is true with the Houthis, who will continue their attacks on Red Sea shipping as long as Iran wants them to and provides the resources for the attacks. The question becomes what the incoming Trump administration will do about the Houthis, and their Iranian backers. It is too early to tell.” – General Rick Waddell

“The Houthis have demonstrated an immense capacity to withstand attacks against their infrastructure. The Saudis pounded them for a decade and this strategy altered their attack profile very little. This is a resilient terrorist organization. However, their vulnerability is their dependence on their sustainment, politically and militarily, from Tehran. Like most of the regional challenges, the solution path goes through Tehran. The Houthis will remain relevant until their support network of shipping, money access, and political advocacy is interrupted. The strategic focus must be centered on access to and safe passage of the global commons. Punishing the Houthis exclusively will not meet the objective. Punishing Tehran will.” – General Spider Marks

“The specter of a nuclear weapon remains one of the only effective deterrence tools the Iranians have. They are likely to restore this tool swiftly and not give it up lightly. One thing to watch will be the relationships that emerge among the Abraham Accords nations, Iran, and the Houthis (who have trained around 200,000 fighters). A re-emergent Houthi force is a great risk to Saudi Arabia. This scenario has an unfortunate precedent, and one that surely captures the attention of Saudi leadership. The Houthis and the Iranians – with intelligence from Russia and ‘dark fleet’ support from China – continue to profit handsomely from the status quo.” – General Michael Groen

“Iran is at an interesting crossroad following the U.S. elections. I assess the Iranian regime is willing to accept the consequences of another strike against Israel. Iran may be waiting to gauge the opportunity for any level of dialogue with the new U.S. administration – albeit it is likely that the Trump administration will look to impose stronger sanctions. As of October, the Intelligence Community had still not changed their assessment that Iran had reversed a 2003 decision to cease a nuclear weapons production program. The regional conflict is likely bringing those discussions back to the table for Iranian leadership. It may just be a risk determination for the Iranian Supreme Leader. He knows Israel will strike should Netanyahu become aware that they have made a decision to build a weapon. The U.S. may not be part of an initial strike, but would provide defense/intelligence to support such a strike.” – General Robert Ashley

“If the new Iranian president wants to talk to the U.S. and the West, then another strike would be foolish. If the Iranians don’t retaliate then there may be an early window for the Trump team to look at the nuclear program and come to a deal. I suspect the Saudis could broker a quiet discussion which would be in their self-interest.” – General Frank Kearney

“Our desired end state regarding the Houthis will require offensive policy, authorities, and permissions against Iranian targets, as well as aggressive maritime interdiction, strike, and a restart of irregular warfare operations on the ground with special operations forces (in addition to interagency coordination and Saudi support for targeting and foreign internal defense). Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Oman will need to aggressively support land and sea interdiction. We need to adjust our execution of power projection from multi-billion dollar capital ships and expensive standard missiles to drones and AI for ubiquitous surveillance and over-the-horizon targeting.” – Admiral Collin Green

Biden Loosens Restrictions on U.S. Weapons Used in Russia

In our previous ATW, we reported on the North Korean troops that were sent to help Russia in its war against Ukraine. Last week, it was also rumored that North Korea could be in a position to send up to 100,000 troops to Russia to help drive Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region. In response, per our previous SITREP, the Biden administration released the restrictions on the use of U.S. long-range weapons inside of Russia. A few days after this announcement, Ukraine utilized the ATACMS platform in an attack on an ammunition depot inside of Russia. Ukraine also followed up the attack with a strike on Russian forces around Kursk with UK Storm Shadow cruise missiles. Ukraine does not have a large supply of either weapon (and the U.S. and the UK have said they do not have many more to send). However, it will have some impact, and the use of the weapons clearly upsets Putin, who has threated that using these weapons inside of Russia is a major escalation. As a result, Putin enacted a change to his nuclear doctrine that lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Russia also employed a new ballistic missile against Ukraine that some initially thought was an ICBM using a conventional warhead. It was later identified as the “Oreshnik” IRBM. As Russia tries to make progress in pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk and keeping/expanding upon territorial gains in the east, Putin will try to deter the West from continuing to support Ukraine with more advanced and longer-range systems, and at the same time strengthen his position in advance of any potential ceasefire negotiations starting in 2025.

“President Biden’s approval for the Ukrainian military to use U.S. provided ATACMS inside of Russia is part of the ongoing chess match with Putin. Russia recently introduced North Korean troops into the war. It was an unprecedented escalation. The use of ATACMS and the UK’s Storm Shadow missiles signals to North Korean President Kim Jong Un that his troops are at risk. Putin sees the approval to use the ATACMS inside of Russia as crossing a redline and claims that NATO is now at war with Russia. He further escalated the situation by lowering his threshold for using nuclear weapons. We’ve heard this tune before from Putin, and it follows his past threats to use nuclear weapons over the transfer of Patriot Missile systems, tanks, F-16s, and ATACMS to the Ukrainian military. President-elect Trump’s stated intent to end the war quickly is resulting in a race by both sides to enhance their negotiating positions through battlefield gains prior to Trump bringing them to the negotiating table.” – General Robert Walsh

“We used to think that fighting in the winter in Ukraine was almost impossible. However, the Russians continued their meat grinder operations continuously during the last two winters, and they look to do the same this winter, using the North Korean troops. Open media has long cited the number of ‘1,000 Russian casualties per day’ in 2024, with 500,000 to 600,000 total Russian casualties so far. Yet, Russian force generation efforts allow the attacks to continue. The next escalation is the use of large numbers of North Korean troops, likely in the Kursk salient.” – General Rick Waddell

“There are several escalatory scenarios following the North Korean deployment of troops to join the fight against Ukraine. However, we should view this as an opportunity to find common objectives between Washington and Beijing. China is not encouraged by the provocative decision by NK to send troops into Ukraine. Beijing must be looking at this through a skeptical lens. There is no reason to believe that the NK troops will favorably alter Russian military conditions on the ground. In fact, new troops with little regional familiarity, untested capabilities, and no proven interoperability experience with Russian forces are a liability. More likely, NK troops will become expendable to the obviously feckless Russian leadership. This reveals desperation by the Kim regime, incentivized only by money. South Korea has already indicated a willingness to send artillery to Ukraine in response to NK’s deployment. This doesn’t help. The U.S. can find common ground with China to reduce the likelihood of unintended consequences…especially on the Korean peninsula.” – General Spider Marks

“The military ‘mass’ provided by the DPRK is of limited consequence, but it does open a window to how the DPRK might operate in the future. Both the Russians and Chinese will have the ability to use the DPRK as a tool for deniable disruption almost anywhere they choose, while shielding their own efforts from condemnation. The best response for the U.S. would be to ensure the regional relationships and alliances are held strong.” – General Michael Groen

“The numbers that the DPRK is contributing are not consequential, but do provide some support to Russia. The DPRK is likely the winner in this equation, obtaining greater access to advanced weapons, cheap fuel, submarine technology, warfighting experience, and international prestige for Kim.” – General Robert Ashley

“Recent undersea cable sabotage in the Baltic Sea raised global alarm when two critical undersea fiber-optic cables were severed. The cut caused disruption to communications between Finland, Germany, Sweden, and Lithuania. European officials pointed to escalating Russian hybrid activities, related to the Western military support of Ukraine, as a likely cause, although Moscow denied colluding with the Chinese ship that was in the area at the time. The Baltic incident is not isolated—similar events in recent years reveal the growing vulnerability of these massive networks vital to the world’s economy, as they carry 99% of international data, including financial transactions, internet traffic, and military communications. From suspected Chinese involvement in damaging cables near Taiwan to Russian surveillance ships loitering near Irish cable sites, adversaries have increasingly targeted this infrastructure as part of a broader gray-zone strategy of deniable aggression.

In addition, on November 21, 2024, Russia launched a new intermediate-range ballistic missile, named ‘Oreshnik,’ targeting a military facility in the central Ukrainian city of Dnipro. This marked the first combat use of this missile, possibly escalating the conflict and raising concerns about regional security dynamics. The missile, capable of hypersonic speeds up to Mach 10, is assessed to be able to evade current Western missile defense systems, potentially altering NATO’s defense strategies. Putin confirmed the use of the experimental missile in televised remarks and said it was in response to Kyiv’s use of longer-range U.S. and British missiles in strikes in southern Russia.” – General Mary O’Brien

U.S. Reinforces Partnerships in Indo-Pacific to Counter China

As we have addressed in previous ATWs, tensions between China and Taiwan have been simmering since Lai was inaugurated back in May as the new president of Taiwan. In October, China conducted military exercises once again simulating a blockade of Taiwan. In an effort to reinforce U.S. relationships in the region, Secretary of Defense Ausin met with Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles and Japanese Defense Minister Nakatani Gen as part of the 14th Trilateral Defense Minister’s Meeting. At this gathering, the leaders of the three nations finalized new steps to further enhance defense cooperation and interoperability. It is critical for the U.S. to continue to strengthen its relationships in the region in order to not only create a counterbalance to China, but to also send a signal of deterrence. In particular, one of the key takeaways from the recent wargame conducted last week by the U.S. House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was that in the event of a conflict, Taiwan would have to fight off a Chinese blockade and invasion for around a month before the United States could successfully airlift or sealift forces or munitions to support it. This observation not only highlighted the need for the U.S. to continue to support Taiwan militarily, but to also have a regional support structure in place to assist in logistics to allow for a faster response time in the event of a crisis. Another key event this month was the APEC meeting in Lima, Peru, which included 21 leaders from countries bordering the Pacific (that jointly account for almost two-thirds of global GDP and half the world’s trade). One major development from the meeting was Xi’s inauguration of a massive $1.3 billion “mega-port” in Peru that could become South America’s biggest shipping hub. This is another example of China pushing further into the U.S. sphere of influence and partnering with countries to diversify its trade options to potentially offset the impact from any incremental tariffs that could come about in the new administration.

“Former President Trump’s re-election is causing concern amongst allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region that he will move towards an isolationist view of foreign policy. Trump’s China strategy is to compete with China and not let Xi Jinping replace him as the global economic leader. He is surrounding himself with China Hawks like Senator Rubio and Congressman Waltz. This indicates that he will continue his previous policy (and President Biden’s policy) of building partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific region to counter China’s economic, military, and diplomatic behavior. The U.S. policy under President Biden was to continue building relations with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, and India. Trump is expected to continue his transactional approach to relationships that he established during his first administration. He uses transactional relationships to build coalitions of partners and allies. Japan’s former Prime Minister Abe built his relationship with Trump by personally connecting with him, investing/creating jobs in the U.S., and he did not rely on the U.S. ‘defending’ Japan, but instead supported the U.S. in its security approach to countering China’s growing regional influence.” – General Robert Walsh

“China’s importation of two million barrels of oil per day should be a reminder of their global vulnerabilities. That said, while the PLA is not an innovative/experienced maneuver military, they can substitute massive repetition and training for a potential operation anywhere in the South China Sea or Taiwan. The whole world has seen these rehearsals. All would be well-served by an integrated alliance of nations that do not want to see the Pacific disrupted by chaos. Finding the right accountabilities and rules of the road is incredibly important if we do not want an unfortunate and unnecessary war.” – General Michael Groen

“China’s actions in response to President Lai’s diplomatic engagements as well as regional U.S. engagement with our Pacific partners will ensure that Xi remains aggressive, but incur no risk for Xi regarding future talks with the new Trump administration.” – General Robert Ashley

“China continues to take advantage of our inattention to Latin America. President Xi, while in Peru for the APEC, inaugurated Peru’s Chancay Port. This is China’s first port in South America, a deep-water port, with military-civilian ‘dual use’ potential. The China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) has complete control of operations for the mega-port and who can use it (and under what conditions) for the next 30 years. GEN Richardson, former SOUTHCOM CDR, said that this port will further facilitate Chinese extraction of resources (copper, lithium, soybeans, etc.) from the region, and that should be concerning.” – General KK Chinn

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