What has Happened:

• Earlier today, it was announced that Alexei Navalny, who was an outspoken critic of President Putin, died in a Russian Arctic Circle maximum-security prison.
• Navalny, who had been behind bars since he returned to Russia in 2021, had been serving a 30-year sentence when he supposedly felt sick and lost consciousness.
• While the cause of death is still TBD, in 2020, he was reportedly poisoned with a Soviet-era nerve agent.
• Following his 2021 conviction, protests broke out across Russia and over 10,000 people were detained.
• News of Navalny’s death comes a month before Russia’s presidential election, which is scheduled for March 17^th, where Putin is expected to be elected to a fifth term.
• In addition, this past week, it was reported that Russia was in the process of developing a nuclear space-based weapon designed to target U.S. satellites.
• A nuclear weapon in space would be a violation of the UN’s Outer Space Treaty of 1967.
• Both the U.S. and former Soviet Union have developed and tested anti-satellite weapons dating back to the Cold War (both have also used nuclear power in space).
• While the details are still classified, many experts are suggesting that it is likely a nuclear-powered satellite (as opposed to a nuclear warhead in space) that could carry a variety of electronic warfare capabilities intended to jam or cause interference for U.S. communications and command & control satellites.

Why it Matters:

“Navalny’s death shouldn’t be a surprise given the conditions that he has endured since his imprisonment and Putin’s history of eliminating political and military opponents. It has not been that long since Prigozhin’s plane exploded and crashed. Putin’s grip on Russian politics continues to be strong. His narrative about the special operation in Ukraine and the West’s targeting of Russia still resonates despite casualty numbers. Lack of U.S. Congressional support for Ukraine’s defense shows deteriorating support for Ukraine and is amplifying the messaging to the Russian people that Russia is winning.

As far as Russian efforts to create new anti-satellite capabilities, this is not new for Russia or China. The militarization of space has been underway for some time. The use of nuclear weapons in space to eliminate communications/GPS and anti-satellite capabilities that target individual satellites (leaving adversary satellite networks in place) have been threats for many years. Congressional leaders have stated that the administration is well informed about these efforts and that the nation is working to understand and mitigate future adversary capabilities to further militarize and weaponize space. Bottom line is that space is a contested domain, has been for some time, and will continue to be.” – General Frank Kearney

“The launch of a nuclear weapon capability in space is an obvious and direct violation of the Space Treaty that both the U.S. and Soviet Union signed in 1967. It is not clear if the Russians believed that they could slip in this capability ‘over the radar’ or if this is signaling provocation. Russian Vice President Medvedev makes regular references to the use of nuclear weapons in the Ukrainian context. This may be a component of a messaging campaign to the U.S. and EU supporters of Ukraine.

The most obvious risk of a nuclear weapon in space would be a preemptive attack on the U.S. ability to detect, understand, decide, and respond to a nuclear threat. It could create a ‘knockout blow’ that would cripple the ability of the U.S. nuclear command & control network. The stakes could not be higher because the United States depends on an array of complex sensing and communications assets to receive warnings in the event of a nuclear attack and to execute nuclear orders. This command & control network is highly reliant on space-based assets to operate and provide dependable information to decision makers in the event of a nuclear crisis. Although there has been some modernization, the system architecture still reflects its age. A nuclear blast in space could destroy sensitive communication and sensing equipment onboard a constellation of satellites, but the issue is larger than just blinding a satellite. The U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) network includes detection, warning, attack characterization, adaptive nuclear planning, and decision-making conferencing for receiving and executing presidential orders and enables the management and direction of forces. All of these processes could be impacted by a preemptive attack focused on space-based capability.

While responding to this purposeful provocation, the U.S. must re-examine the entire chain of functions that are products of a 1960s architecture. The NC3 is reviewed periodically, but likely requires a major review through the lens of new technologies, more prolific space capabilities (available to even small nations), and connectivity that might augment or obviate some of NC3’s legacy components.” – General Michael Groen

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