In this month’s edition of Around the World with Academy Securities, our Geopolitical Intelligence Group (GIG) focuses on the following geopolitical tensions that we are monitoring:

1. Ceasefire in Gaza
2. Iran Signs Strategic Partnership Pact with Russia
3. War Between Russia and Ukraine Escalates
4. Chinese Cyber Threat
5. U.S. Engagement with Greenland

In addition to covering the topics above in this month’s report, we begin with a few other “black swans” or potential risks/themes for 2025 from our GIG. With respect to Mexico, General Evans noted that “Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in confirmation testimony that the new administration would not rule out the use of military force to engage Mexican drug cartels. The prospects of U.S. military action in unilateral (non-permissive) cross-border operations could create THE black swan event of 2025.” General Waddell feels that another black swan event could be a commercial blockade of Taiwan by China. Regarding cyber, Linda Weissgold feels that “at some point there will be a cyber-attack that goes beyond political or financial consequences to having large-scale lethal impact.” Regarding the Middle East, General Marks believes that the U.S. could further isolate the Iranian regime, enforce economic sanctions, apply military pressure (Operation Earnest Will redux), and expand signatories to the Abraham Accords. However, General Walsh believes that there is also a risk that Iran acquires a nuclear weapon with developmental support from China and Russia. He also believes that Greenland could move closer to independence from Denmark and agree to a strategic defense treaty with the U.S. Admiral Buck, General Groen, and General Ashley believe that opportunities, competition, and dealing with adversaries in space will be key themes in 2025, while Wendy Lawrence feels that climate change is not getting as much attention as it should.

Please reach out to your Academy coverage officer with any questions and we would be happy to engage.

Front and Center: Ceasefire in Gaza

As we addressed in our recent SITREP, on January 15, Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire deal. During this first 42-day phase, 33 hostages held by Hamas and its partners would be released including women, children, men over the age of 50, and the wounded. In return, Israel would release “hundreds” of Palestinian prisoners. Palestinian civilians in Gaza will be allowed to freely return to the north of the strip, but there would be certain unspecified “security arrangements” in place. In addition, the Israeli military would begin withdrawing from population centers in Gaza during the first phase of the ceasefire but would remain along the Philadelphi Corridor. The expectation is that there would also be an acceleration of aid into Gaza. Negotiations to enable the second and third phases of the ceasefire agreement to occur would begin on the 16th day following the implementation of the deal. While there is no guarantee that the ceasefire lasts longer than the first phase, the hope is that negotiations occur as planned and the goal of returning all hostages drives the discussions forward, leading to a full withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza. Meanwhile, the tenuous ceasefire with Hezbollah is also holding, though there have been reports of violations on both sides. Israel has until the 27^th of January to fully withdraw from Southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah has the same time requirement to pull its forces back behind the Litani River, which would re-establish the buffer zone north of the border. If these agreements hold, we expect discussions to occur in the coming weeks as to the plan for not only the reconstruction of Gaza, but also what form of government will administer the territory during this period and beyond.

“Wars end when one or both combatants no longer want to continue hostilities. This is not the case with Israel and Hamas. Both sides want a pause or ceasefire but have no intent to permanently end hostilities. Israel wants to get the hostages back while Hamas wants to get their prisoners back to fill their ranks, end the IDF’s combat operations against them, and see the Israeli military permanently leave Gaza. Neither side sees the war as over, and that is why it will continue. The hatred for each other remains and the violence will continue even though it may not be at full-scale. Israel has not achieved its number one war objective to destroy Hamas and guarantee Hamas will not govern Gaza or launch attacks in the future. The threat by President Trump coerced both sides to agree to a framework that has been on the table for eight months. Israel will work to get all hostages back and then will begin the next stages of eliminating Hamas. They will not sit back and watch Hamas continue governing Gaza and wait for another October 7th to happen. Hamas’ objective is to survive, maintain governance of Gaza, and rebuild its military capabilities so it can work with Iran to destroy Israel. The second and third phases will break down and lead to the erosion of the ceasefire, continued violence, and the IDF remaining in Gaza. The long-term future for peace between Israel and Hamas remains bleak. The hatred remains and the current ceasefire should be considered temporary.” – General Robert Walsh

“From news accounts, this seems to be mainly the deal worked out in May 2024 that ultimately failed because Hamas wanted more concessions, and Israel’s stated objective was to end Hamas’ rule in Gaza. The U.S. election results likely did move the parties forward, as did Israel’s weakening of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. As we have seen with the ceasefire in Southern Lebanon, the devil of implementation is in the details. This may resemble the first, brief Israeli-Hamas ceasefire, 24 November – 1 December 2023. Again, from media sources, the agreement would have Israel withdraw almost completely from the Netzarim Corridor separating northern and southern Gaza and mostly evacuate the Philadelphi Corridor along the border with Egypt. These movements would be a major gain for Hamas. If phase one is implemented and 33 hostages are swapped for almost 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, then some good will have been done. As with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas is likely to violate the ceasefire shortly after the main exchanges are done. Then the issue will be whether Israel returns in force on the ground into the two corridors, or will it rely mainly on airstrikes and commando raids.” – General Rick Waddell

“We should expect Hamas to aggressively test the IDF’s ability to adhere to the terms of the ceasefire. After over 400 days of violence, untangling combatants will be more than difficult; it will be dangerous and most likely temporary. Many in Israel believe that anything short of the unqualified return of all the hostages invalidates the nation’s sacrifices. However, Trump’s inauguration accelerated the timeline for closure for both the Netanyahu government and the Palestinian Authority. There are many entanglements in any next steps in the broader Mideast (Syrian governance, Hezbollah, new Lebanese government, and weakened Tehran leadership) but, minimally, there is an agreement to stop this conflict. There will be others; recidivist violence defines the Levant.” – General Spider Marks

“The ceasefire will be bittersweet for both sides. It is highly unlikely to resolve anything between Israel and Hamas, thus it is just a pause in violence vice a solution. The ceasefire does not represent any change in the greater Palestinian situation, nor a change in Hamas’ stated commitment to resist/destroy Israel, nor a shift in Israel’s determination to take advantage of the current and ongoing shift in power/influence across the region (Syria, Hezbollah, Iran’s pull back, Russia’s limitations, etc.), thus it is very unlikely to have any long-term positive impact. The question should not be who/what drove the deal to conclusion, but what will drive the next step after phase one. Neighboring countries desire a resolution, but none of them are willing to absorb any of the radical aspects/influences of Hamas. As such, it limits their contribution options for reconstruction and governance. Finally, I do not see either Israel or Hamas changing their desired and stated end-states as a result of a month-long pause, nor do I think this will resolve the Palestinian situation.” – General Mastin Robeson

“While bombs may stop falling, the suffering in Gaza will not end. Gaza was a poorly run, impoverished entity before October 7th and it will continue to be so long after a ceasefire. The discredited Palestinian Authority is in no position to jump in to administer Gaza. Regional donors are likely to contribute millions of dollars to reconstruction, if only to appease their own populations, but billions will be needed, and nobody is ready to step up in ways that might make them ultimately responsible for fixing the problem. Some have argued that we could see a black swan event in 2025 that moves Israel and the Palestinians closer to finally adopting a two-state solution. I won’t say that is impossible given that the Middle East is full of surprises, but that would require a significant shift in Israeli domestic politics and finding a Palestinian leader who can not only speak for both the West Bank and Gaza, but is also willing to bravely advocate for territorial compromises that neither Arafat nor Abu Mazen were willing to accept.” – Linda Weissgold

Iran Signs Strategic Partnership Pact with Russia

Last week, the nuclear discussions between Iran and the United Kingdom, France, and Germany commenced once again in Geneva. Recently, French President Macron said that Iran’s uranium enrichment was nearing the “point of no return” and EU partners to the original nuclear deal should consider reimposing sanctions if there is no progress from Tehran in addressing these concerns. However, later in the week following these discussions, Iranian President Pezeshkian visited President Putin in Moscow to execute a “comprehensive strategic partnership” that will expand trade and cooperation in transport, logistics, and humanitarian spheres and address “acute issues on the regional and international agenda.” Iran has provided Russia with attack drones for use against Ukraine and has also assisted in their production in Russia. In return, Russia has promised to supply Iran with air defense systems and advanced fighter aircraft. However, even with these weapons, the Iranian air defense capability was mostly destroyed in the October strike by Israel and its proxy forces have been significantly degraded, resulting in a weakened Iran. Regardless of the outcome of the EU discussions with Iran, the next phase of engagement could include talks with the U.S. where there could be an offer to come to a larger deal with Iran to end its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The issues that were not addressed in the previous Iran nuclear deal include the support of regional proxy forces and its ballistic missile program, so we expect these issues to be addressed in any broader agreement. However, if an agreement cannot be reached, there is a chance that the Trump administration will make it known that all options will be on the table including additional sanctions (that will be enforced) as well as military action.

“Russia and Iran signed a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership treaty’ covering trade, military cooperation, science, education, and culture. The strategic alignment comes as President Trump enters office. It is another commitment by the axis of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to diminish U.S. global leadership. Both Iran and Russia have major reasons for igniting closer ties. Both have been weakened by conflict. Israel was able to penetrate Iranian airspace with over 150 aircraft without a single loss, making Iran vulnerable to further attacks. Iran’s sphere of influence is wounded, with its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah decimated. It faces economic woes that are expected to deepen with President Trump’s anticipated reinstatement of his ‘maximum pressure’ campaign. Iran wants sophisticated Russian weapons like long-range air defense systems and jet fighters to deter further Israeli attacks. Russia is losing a massive number of soldiers in Ukraine, and it relies on drones from Iran. They also lost a strategic ally in Syria. There is weakness on both sides, and they are very nervous about Trump returning to the White House. He brings strength that almost broke Iran’s back the first time with sanctions. The treaty commits Russia to building more nuclear power plants in Iran that could lead to nuclear weapons development and the complete destabilization of the Middle East. The treaty highlights Iran’s weakened status and the need for Russia underwriting its security. The partnership helps to maintain Russia’s influence in the region after losing Syria in its orbit of influence.” – General Robert Walsh

“During the JCPOA period, Iran was masterful at playing the UK, France, Germany, and the EU. Even if successful at achieving a deal that lifts EU, French, British, and German commercial sanctions, individual British and European companies and banks will be in the same position they were in prior to the JCPOA – authorized to do business with Iran, but facing U.S. sanctions if they do so under the Iran Sanctions Act of 2006. The new Trump administration is likely to pick up where they left off four years ago – maximum sanctions pressure with an offer of negotiations to end the possibility of Iran ever making a nuclear weapon. The Houthis are a separate issue (not directly tied to nuclear negotiations) so I expect the new administration will continue to strike the Houthis and seek to curtail their Iranian resupply. Like Bush 43, Obama, and Biden, Trump 47 will retain a military option should Iran move to assemble a nuclear weapon.” – General Rick Waddell

“In its strategy to minimize Tehran’s influence, the new administration will pick back up on its diplomatic efforts to expand the signatories to the Abraham Accords. Increasingly, and frankly at a more aggressive pace, Iran’s regional neighbors are isolating Tehran. Clearly Tehran can ‘depend’ on Moscow and Beijing to remain supportive, but the limits of that support will begin to be reached. Russia has its own obvious set of problems and limitations while China views Iran as a pliable client, able to provide discounted energy and to be an asymmetric and persistent irritant to the U.S. and its partners. With feckless military strikes against Israel, and severely damaged proxy forces, Iran is vulnerable. Regime change in Tehran is not a realistic goal now but increasing pressure (both economic and military) coordinated through a coalition of nations could challenge its credibility.” – General Spider Marks

“The new administration will take a harder line against Iran than the Biden administration did; but I do not see Iran halting their nuclear program, ceasing to support and work through their proxies, or backing down from their stated intent of destroying Israel. The question is whether the new administration stop Russia, China, and Iran from circumventing each other’s sanctions. Impacting/influencing nefarious things that derive out of Yemen is a significant challenge. The ruling parties in Sanaa have never been successful at influencing such actions. Yemen remains the wild west. As such ‘cutting off’ the Houthis will be a challenge.” – General Mastin Robeson

“Nuclear negotiations/pressure on Iran would be useful, but actions taken to reduce the massive (and illegal) revenue stream from oil sales to China would be a much stronger message to the Iranian leadership. The Russian/Iranian relationship is troublesome but not decisive. A broader pressure campaign against Iran (i.e., more sticks, fewer carrots) would further alienate the Mullahs from their citizens. The Saudis, Emiratis, and Americans collectively have the opportunity to approach this problem with strength.” – General Michael Groen

War Between Russia and Ukraine Escalates

Following Ukraine’s massive drone and long-range missile attack into Russia last week, Russia answered with an attack on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Of note, Ukraine used six U.S. ATACMS and 22 UK Storm Shadow cruise missiles in their latest series of strikes against Russian airbases. In November, following the first use of the ATACMS, Putin ordered the use of a new intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile known as the “Oreshnik” in order to put Ukraine (and the West) on notice for easing the restrictions on the use of these weapons inside Russia. In addition, sabotage operations by Russia started to come to light. In early December, a Chinese-flagged ship severed internet sea cables in the Baltics, and many assumed it was Russia’s doing. In addition, a warning from the U.S. to Putin was given regarding “suspicious fires” occurring on cargo planes thought to be test runs for an attack on these aircraft in flight. While this shadow war is likely intended to try to discourage NATO’s support of Ukraine, it also runs the risk of a miscalculation that could result in a direct confrontation with a NATO country. We continue to believe that the war will slowly escalate, but the expectation is that the Trump administration will pressure both sides to come to the negotiating table in an effort to end the war in Ukraine in the coming months.

“Russia is significantly increasing its covert operations by conducting a sabotage and hybrid-warfare campaign against European infrastructure to include more brazen attacks. Russia’s shadow fleet of tankers and research vessels is being used to conduct espionage, sever undersea cables, cripple energy and communications networks, and avoid oil sanctions. The dark fleet converts ordinary commercial vessels into covert sabotage and sanctions avoidance tools. They do everything they can to hide their location, including the use of signal jamming. Other sabotage attempts include aircraft arson, drone flights, GPS jamming, railway and gas facilities disruption, attacks on defense companies supporting Ukraine, and dark web social media attacks. Additionally, Russia and China are conducting provocative joint naval operations in the Baltics. Russia’s campaign is intended to disrupt the lives of everyday Europeans, damage cohesion, and weaken Western support for Ukraine.” – General Robert Walsh

“Russia will continue to operate in the ‘grey zone’ as they have since their first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, but they will seek to keep those activities below the level of a direct confrontation with a NATO member. Both sides continue to face manpower issues along the 600-mile line of contact. While both sides can mass drone and missile strikes, neither side seems able to mass effectively for anything other than localized tactical breakthroughs. It is too early to tell what set of ‘carrots and sticks’ will be available when Special Envoy Kellogg goes to work, but both sides might welcome even a short ceasefire, giving them time to rest, rearm, and refit.” – General Rick Waddell

“Russia has never acted in accordance with internationally recognized laws of land warfare or accepted protocols between combatants. However, since Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine (including the brutality of the ‘conventional’ fighting in Ukraine, the human suffering, and the enormous cost in lives on both sides), every element of national power and international condemnation has been synchronized to resist Russia’s adventurism. The terror that Russia exports routinely to achieve political objectives, weaken political opponents, and silence discordant voices has not abated since the invasion of Ukraine. It continues. But the outrage for those ‘intrigues,’ the acts of sabotage, the poisonings, and the cutting of undersea cables has been muted. That’s changing. Russia’s military is embarrassing itself in combat. It survives but is a failure. With a globally recognized incompetent military that is now reliant on equally feckless North Korean troops to continue the fight, global indignation is galvanized on vilifying Putin. It is improbable that Putin can be held accountable for the crimes he has directed, but all effort should be focused on uncovering and ‘legally’ putting him on notice again.” – General Spider Marks

“From a single inadvertent internet cable being severed, to a spate of incidents including both data and power cables being severed, the sea floor is becoming a battlefield as covert, ‘gray zone’ tactics increase. The undersea environment is going to be a front line in our future conflicts. The most egregious recent event was the M/T EAGLE S, which dragged its anchor for over 60 miles on December 25th, cutting four data cables and the Estlink-2 power cable from Finland to Estonia and other countries. The Finnish President Alexander Stubb said at the NATO Summit in Helsinki that his country had stopped the crew of a Russia-linked oil tanker just minutes before it caused catastrophic damage to numerous other undersea cables in the Baltic Sea. Had it continued for another 12 minutes, the carnage would have been much worse than the four data (and one electric) cables that were severed.” – Admiral Mark Heinrich

Chinese Cyber Threat

As we have addressed in our previous ATWs, we continue to monitor tensions between China and its neighbors. However, we are also very focused on the persistent threat of Chinese cyberwarfare. Last year in our SITREP on Volt Typhoon, we addressed the “urgent risk” that was posed by Chinese state-sponsored actors that had penetrated U.S. critical infrastructure. The intent of these intrusions was to covertly gain access to our networks, remain hidden, and “live off the land.” This strategy allows the threat group to pre-position itself inside U.S. systems and use the targeted organization’s own tools to attack the network. This malicious code can also remain dormant and emerge at a time of crisis to disrupt communication, port operations, or other areas that would hamper a U.S. response (from Guam, for example) to the South China Sea. This threat appears to be just the tip of the iceberg as the intrusions from state-sponsored actors have accelerated over the past year. In the lead up to the 2024 election, Salt Typhoon, a Chinese state-backed hacker group, targeted data from numerous U.S. officials, including phones used by President Trump and Vice President Vance as well as phones from staff members of Vice President Kamala Harris’ campaign, presumably for intelligence collection. Salt Typhoon also breached at least nine U.S. telecommunications networks and providers. Most recently in December of 2024, a Chinese state-sponsored actor infiltrated Treasury workstations in what officials described as a “major incident.” The U.S. has warned China that it would face severe consequences if it launched a cyber-attack that results in physical destruction. In addition, outgoing National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan highlighted this threat to the incoming Trump administration as one that needs to be addressed moving forward.

“All eyes will be on President Trump and his administration on how they will tackle China’s increasing cyber espionage campaign that is exploiting aging telecommunications infrastructure vulnerabilities to attack U.S. infrastructure, intellectual property, companies, government and military officials, and citizens. Outgoing FBI Director Wray named China as the ‘greatest long-term threat facing our country’ and its cyber program as ‘the defining threat of our generation.’ Trump is expected to enhance cyber defenses and tackle China as a cyber threat using AI and quantum computing solutions. China, like Russia, uses hybrid-warfare in nontraditional ways like prepositioning trojan malware on U.S. critical infrastructure that lies in wait on networks to commit attacks at a time and place of their choosing. Their unprecedented and growing espionage actions also have a coercive and deterrent effect on U.S. war plans. Trump identified the growing China cyber threat in his first administration and initiated actions to counter the threat. Biden continued with foundational actions and developed a National Cybersecurity Strategy. Trump’s inclination to make a deal with Chinese President Xi will be challenged by China’s cyber espionage campaign.” – General Robert Walsh

“Trump 47, like Trump 45, will initially focus more on the economic and trade relationship with China. Soon, however, they will necessarily face these aggressive Chinese actions, which appear to be shaping actions for a larger conflict. This will require the development of countervailing cyber capabilities.” – General Rick Waddell

“China is the most pernicious geopolitical challenge for the U.S. as far into the 21st century as we can see. While there have been a lot of revelations in the press recently about Chinese actions, it would be a mistake to think that Beijing only recently shifted from stealing trade secrets to real espionage and planting code into key infrastructure. FBI Director Wray publicly testified in 2021 that the FBI was opening a China-related espionage investigation roughly every twelve hours. The PRC seeks to overtake the U.S. in every domain, and it is already a rival with more reach, in more domains than we have ever faced. During the Cold War we were focused mostly on military and ideological competition with the Soviet Union. We face challenges from China in these same areas, but also technological competition, economic competition, and competition in cyber space. At the turn of the century, China was not even close to being a global leader in technology. Now, it’s a leader in AI, drones, hypersonics, and web applications, among other domains. In my opinion, some of the most consequential competition will occur in the technological innovation and exploitation space, quantum computing, and bioengineering. Much of China’s success is due to pursuing a whole of country, vice a whole of government, approach on issues that the PRC believes are existential. This means that better cooperation between the U.S. public and private sectors is going to be crucial to winning any competition with China.” – Linda Weissgold

“There is now an opportunity to create a new normal and new hardened infrastructure. This needs to be followed up with a surge of investment in hardening the new advancements in an Agentic-AI ecosystem for global commerce, a surge in data centers, and distributed global compute. The stakes are so much bigger than a ‘hack here-and-there.’ A system with accountabilities for state actors and serious legal penalties for others could emerge from the ashes of the current wild west.” – General Michael Groen

“China is investing heavily in its space program with a goal of landing a man on the moon by 2030 and leveraging space as a point of departure for future Mars exploration. What is disconcerting is the offensive capability China has already placed in space to conduct proximity operations that can damage U.S. satellite constellations. The status of space treaties has been relatively dormant since the late 1970’s. The first such agreement, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in space, was signed by Russia and China. Our ability to access space will only grow more contested and much like cyber it will be an area where China will seek to blind the U.S. and its allies during a conflict.” – General Robert Ashley

“Chinese Lunar New Year is January 29 so there has been decreased military activity, and it will remain that way until February. President Xi sent his VP to attend the presidential inauguration, so in 2025 we can expect to see increased meetings and discussions between the two countries focused on economic competition and a decrease in military tensions, much like we saw with North Korea during Trump’s first term as he works to build a relationship. I wouldn’t be surprised if President Trump brings up that the only remaining ‘colonizer’ on Chinese land is Russia, and that the 1860 Treaty of Peking (Siberia Treaty of 1860) was an unjust treaty which blocked China’s access to the Sea of Japan, allowed Russia to build Vladivostok (Pacific Navy base), and gave Russia direct land access to North Korea. Is this an opportunity for China to make a deal with a weakened Russia? In 2025, the Arctic and Antarctica will continue to be regions of geopolitical competition as China works to build infrastructure in both regions and sets conditions for potential opportunities as climate change increases access and economic potential.” – General KK Chinn

U.S. Engagement with Greenland

While there was talk about acquiring Greenland in Trump’s first term, there is once again a renewed interest in expanding the partnership with the country or even acquiring Greenland. Greenland has a population of 56,000 and has a significant amount of natural resources that include oil, gas, and rare earth elements (including 31 different minerals, such as lithium and graphite). These are materials that are needed for everything from critical national security components to electric vehicle batteries. Of note, China currently produces about 65% of the world’s graphite. As these elements and resources become easier to access, it provides an opportunity for the U.S., especially as China further restricts access to certain elements in response to the U.S. tightening restrictions on advanced chip technology. Denmark is responsible for Greenland’s foreign affairs and defense, but the U.S. operates a base there named Pituffik Space Base (which includes a ballistic missile early warning system). While Greenland has been part of the kingdom of Denmark since 1721, it’s a self-governing territory that gained autonomy in 1979. The PM has told President Trump that the island nation is not for sale, but they are open to increasing its responsibility for security in the Arctic and working more closely with the U.S. on defense and exploring its mining resources. While the rhetoric will likely increase as talks continue, what is clear is that the Trump administration is very focused on Greenland for strategic reasons.

“President Trump identified Greenland as strategically important to the U.S. in our growing competition with China. The changing geopolitical and geographic environment has resulted in increased competition in space and missile defense, the widening Arctic Passage, and the growing need for rare earth minerals. Greenland is key to all three. China recently placed more emphasis on Greenland as a potential major piece of its Belt and Road Initiative. Greenland’s discourse on independence has opened the door for strategic competition between China and the U.S. over access. President Trump views Greenland as a vital location for U.S. future strategic needs. Greenland is rich in rare earth minerals and China gaining control of them would place it in an even more dominant position. China wants to be a major player in the Arctic, is acquiring increased access to global ports and infrastructure, and is stepping up its military and commercial activities in the region. Their open checkbook is a threat to the U.S. in its own back yard (as seen throughout South and Central America). China claims to be an Arctic player without access to Arctic ports. Access to Greenland would be a strategic dagger aimed at U.S. power and influence. The future could see China increase its domination of critical minerals with their warships operating in the U.S. back yard if the competition is lost.” – General Robert Walsh

“The Chinese have already been seeking accommodations in Greenland for ports, airfields, and minerals, which is no different than their behavior in the Pacific island nations. Our actions need to be seen in this light. Outright acquisition of the territory seems like a remote outcome, but a deepened partnership with Greenland and Denmark for mutual defense and economic development and to keep the Chinese out should be an acceptable result. A third possibility, also remote, would see the 56,000 Greenlanders declare independence from the Danish monarchy, and then seek a Compact of Free Association with the U.S., putting them in the same status as Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau.” – General Rick Waddell

“The false narrative is that ‘Trump wants to buy Greenland.’ He’s not entirely wrong, but the U.S. must enhance its relationship with Greenland. Greenland has the West’s largest critical mineral deposits and the northern hemisphere’s ‘biggest stores of nickel and cobalt, essential for batteries.’ Several years ago, Greenland essentially rebuffed China’s efforts to exploit these rare earths. It was a financial and trade deal…not characterized then as ‘buying’ Greenland. Let’s be clear, China’s Belt and Road Initiative for over ten years has done just that. China has established trade agreements that create a Faustian bargain for all nations that they engage with. China ‘buys’ access at a rather inflated price and essentially enjoys limitless exploitation rights. Rare earths are not rare; they simply are rare for the U.S. That must change. A strong and clear-eyed trade relationship with Greenland should be a priority for this new administration.” – General Spider Marks

“The American relationship with Denmark, Greenland, Iceland, Canada, and many other raw material-rich friends is important. They are already our market partners, and many are signature allies. We have gained from (and contributed to) these partners for a long time. The U.S. and President Trump have a golden opportunity to build a positive relationship around our proven friends for globally rare mineral availability. ‘Friend-shoring’ is an enormous opportunity of which we have not yet taken full advantage. It is in this space where our advantage lies. The location (e.g., the GIUK gap) is an added benefit. The Chinese have proven manipulative and exploitative in their capture of global markets for raw materials. The U.S. could readily turn this into a deal-making opportunity.” – General Michael Groen

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