What has Happened:

• Yesterday, President Trump said on social media that he had “ordered two nuclear submarines” to be repositioned in response to online threats from Russia’s former president, Dmitri Medvedev.
• It is extremely rare for the U.S. military to publicly discuss the deployment and location of U.S. submarines given their sensitive mission of nuclear deterrence.
• It was not clear what kind of nuclear submarines to which President Trump was referring (attack submarines vs. ballistic missile submarines).
• The United States has nuclear-powered attack submarines that search for other submarines, but it also has far larger, nuclear-powered, and nuclear-armed submarines.
• The United States has a total of 14 Ohio Class nuclear-powered submarines, each capable of carrying 20 Trident II D5 ballistic missiles that can deliver multiple thermonuclear warheads up to 4,600 miles.
• Earlier this week, Trump said that his deadline for Russia to end the war in Ukraine was being shortened from 50 to 10 days, and Thursday he said that he had already decided to impose “secondary sanctions” on countries that buy Russian oil (which would include China, India, and Turkey).

Why it Matters:

“President Trump‘s ordering of two U.S. Navy nuclear submarines into strategic positions is based on former Russian President Dimitri Medvedev’s provocative comments. He and Putin periodically threatened the Biden administration with using nuclear weapons to back them down from supplying Ukraine’s military with more sophisticated weapons. This was the first time Medvedev or Putin used a similar threat with President Trump. Trump’s actions are another sign that he is tired of dealing with Russia’s unwillingness to negotiate a ceasefire, their bullying tactics, and their unrelenting attacks on the Ukrainian people. This messaging and repositioning of nuclear submarines matches the Navy’s evolving concept of operations to counter Russia and China with missions not seen since the Cold War.” – General Robert Walsh

 “Medvedev serves as Putin’s enforcer within the circles of oligarchs. He has a long history of ‘threatening nuclear language’ (something less than direct threats). When Putin wants to send a message, he often trots out Medvedev. As a potential successor to Putin, Medvedev is an incredibly dangerous politician. Medvedev’s rhetoric can never entirely be ignored, but this may be more of a signal to the West that ‘Medvedev could be worse’ compared to how Putin is handling diplomacy and the war effort. Clearly there is a large element of psychological signaling here for the Europeans (and the domestic Russian population). That said, President Trump’s response seems credible and is not overstated. This is a place where POTUS, the negotiator, is well-suited to deal with this rhetoric. The actual nuclear threat is minimal, and POTUS’s restrained response was a good first step. We need to watch the reactions of the Europeans very carefully.” – General Michael Groen 

“The danger of nuclear saber-rattling and unpredictability goes both ways. The unusual decision to advertise the movement of U.S. nuclear subs with vague threats increases the possibilities for miscalculation. Russian foreign policy today is in many ways reminiscent of that of the Soviet Union. It is driven by great power ambition, a sense of historic destiny, nationalism, and a lot of insecurity. With that in mind, we should remember the 1983 NATO exercise, Able Archer, that some argue unintentionally brought us close to a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. What we saw as a routine exercise was perceived by members of the Soviet leadership as a guise to hide a potential attack, leading them to ready nuclear weapons. An ill-informed and stressed President Putin could easily jump to the same misinterpretation today. I agree that this isn’t likely to change things on the ground in Ukraine. In fact, an argument could be made that this could make it more difficult for Putin to compromise—not that I believe he is inclined to do so—because he won’t want to look scared.” – Linda Weissgold, former CIA Deputy Director for Analysis

 “The President may extend the 10-day deadline as he has done several times in other cases. However, if he applies secondary sanctions to reduce Russian trade flows, the measures will hit hardest on the Indian and Chinese importers of Russian hydrocarbons. Whether the tariffs also seek to reduce Russian exports of grain and fertilizers remains to be seen since such reductions would harm a variety of smaller countries, and would presumably drive up food prices in fragile states. One might note that the recent 50% punitive tariffs announced against Brazil exempted hydrocarbons, airplanes and parts, iron ore, fertilizers, and orange juice.” – General Rick Waddell

 “This does nothing to fundamentally change Putin’s strategic calculus or the facts on the ground in Ukraine. Yes, there is always a possibility of a strategic misstep and escalation, but I don’t see that in this case. Trump wants to flex his nuclear muscle via a demonstration of capability. This isn’t going to change what is happening in Ukraine nor will it drive Putin to peace talks. Let’s take this for what it is – another veiled threat by Medvedev and an actual demonstration by Trump of his growing level of frustration. No one is about to dust off the launch codes. All good drama for consumption.” – General Robert Ashley

 “I do not believe Putin is swayed by ‘world’ opinion. His focus audience is his population and his passion to go down in Russian history as the greatest Russian ‘strong man leader.’ His control of the news and media in Russia enables him to spin things in his favor. In keeping with the 3 options that such wars offer — status quo, escalation, and an off-ramp, Putin will eventually choose an off-ramp in order to survive, but only when he has set the conditions that ‘elevates his status’ amongst the Russian people. The fact that this fight has enhanced Russia’s relationship with North Korea and China has only benefitted Putin and extended the conflict. The upside for the ‘free world’ and the downside for Russia is that extending the conflict will further unify NATO and Europe. After 34 years, NATO/Europe is finally getting serious about increasing their defense spending.” – General Mastin Robeson

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