What has Happened:

• Late last week, President Trump released his National Security Strategy with a focus on building up a larger military presence in the Western Hemisphere, balancing global trade, tightening up border security, and winning the culture war with Europe.
• The new strategy sets out the core principles of Trump’s “America First” foreign policy, including the use of “lethal force” to stop drug cartels, and competing economically with China.
• In addition, it also provides the first explicit reference to the President replicating the Monroe Doctrine.
• The new National Security Strategy maintains the language of “strategic competition” when discussing Taiwan’s status and calls for working more closely with partners and allies in the Pacific to deter any attempt to seize Taiwan.
• President Trump is working to draw down U.S. responsibilities in the Middle East, partly by focusing on increasing American energy exports and describing Iran and its proxy forces as greatly weakened following the 12-day war with Israel and U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites.

Why it Matters:

“The new National Security Strategy outlines President Trump’s vision to steer the nation in a new direction, consistent with his ‘America First’ agenda on which he was elected. Like a corporate strategy, this document will guide the allocation of funding and resources, shifting focus from previous priorities. Departments and agencies will allocate resources based on the five geographic areas and functional priorities specified in the strategy. Historically, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe were the priorities. The new strategy prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, emphasizing burden-sharing and partnerships to achieve regional objectives. It continues to address competition with China, aiming to reduce tensions while leveraging allies and partners to counter China’s aggression. The focus on the Western Hemisphere reinforces the Monroe Doctrine, prioritizing national security by controlling borders and managing population flows. It seeks to prevent non-Hemispheric competitors, particularly China, from gaining influence. The strategy advocates for non-interventionism and avoiding prolonged overseas conflicts. It emphasizes developing a robust industrial base, a dominant energy sector, and advancements in science and technology to lead global innovation through soft power. Military modernization is focused on ensuring access in the First Island Chain and the South China Sea, aiming to deter China with the support of allies and partners. Naval power is highlighted, aligning with the administration’s priority to rebuild the shipbuilding industrial base. The strategy also calls for Europe and NATO to take on more responsibility, reducing U.S. spending in Europe, and encouraging European nations to contribute more, given their stronger economies compared to Russia. The administration takes credit for reducing Iran as a threat in the Middle East and thus places more emphasis on economic development.” – General Robert Walsh

“Certainly, the most significant shift is the nuanced ‘decoupling’ from allies in Europe while acknowledging the shifting power dynamic and continued rise of China. While not novel in and of itself (other administrations have acknowledged this shift), it is more pronounced and less ambiguous in this NSS. As others have pointed out, any NSS is principally written as an ‘America First’ strategy document, but the new Trump NSS doubles down on a ‘Monroe-esque’ approach to the Western Hemisphere that has been soft played in at least the last three versions. It should give all of us pause that the Russians, for the first time in decades, are tacitly supporting this U.S. strategy document. It remains to be seen if this administration can stay the course and reorder the elements of national power, retain our critical alliances/partnerships, and deter an ever-aggressive China in order to achieve real outcomes.” – General John Evans

“This NSS represents a significant strategic reorientation – not merely a new set of priorities – reflecting a shift from military primacy to economic statecraft, from global commitments to hemispheric prioritization, and from institutional diplomacy to a more personalized, executive-driven approach. In short, it elevates geoeconomic competition as the dominant vector of U.S. grand strategy. While the NSS champions economic tools, it remains light on the institutional reforms or interagency mechanisms required to operationalize them. These should follow.

The document places less emphasis on traditional security issues and large-scale military engagement than previous versions, with clear geographic priorities in the Western Hemisphere and Indo-Pacific. It highlights preferences for standoff, precision, and cross-domain capabilities rather than ground-intensive deployments – implying budgetary shifts towards sea power (including the Coast Guard), space, missile defense, cyber, select air capabilities, and AI-enabled enhancements. Nuclear forces receive relatively little attention, though they remain inherent to deterrence. The declining emphasis on ground forces and forward deployments will make the resource environment particularly challenging for the Army. Expect diminished U.S. basing and engagement in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Finally, the redefinition of transatlantic ties will deepen doubts about the U.S. commitment to NATO.

I am encouraged by the strategy’s emphasis on ensuring U.S. technology and standards shape the global environment, and by its call to invest in basic science and innovation. As a broad strategy document, the NSS offers ambitious goals without clear pathways. The United States still lacks a coordinated standards-setting strategy across industry, government, and allies, even as China seeks first-mover advantage in areas such as 6G networks, autonomous systems, and precision navigation and timing, all foundational technologies that will define future economic and security ecosystems.

Energy strategy is another area where global competition is accelerating. By excluding wind and solar from its discussion of energy production, the NSS may inadvertently cede influence in green-energy sectors where China is already dominant – especially in developing markets where renewable technologies may compete directly with U.S. energy offerings.

Finally, while the NSS shifts from aid to trade in Africa (a welcome change), it devotes remarkably little space to a continent critical for minerals, markets, maritime routes, and demographics. Though less proximate than the Western Hemisphere, Africa is another arena the United States cannot afford to cede entirely to China.” – General Karen Gibson

“It is critical to understand that the global world order is changing, and this will affect the NSS’s implementation. The world order has moved from a unipolar to a multipolar world where bi-lateral deals will prevail over the multilateralism that characterized the liberal world order. In this multipolar framework there exists a series of middle powers such as South Africa, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the broader Global South that will play a key role and they will engage in their own national interests operating more and more independently and with greater influence.” – General Robert Ashley

“Analysts see the world as it is, not as they want it to be. Policymakers usually do the opposite. They believe that they can change the world, which is why they become policymakers. The new National Security Strategy tries to walk a middle ground — more bluntly calling the world as the administration sees it and describing an end state that they want to reach with alacrity. Past history, however, shows that the world often gets in the way of such strategies and pace. September 11 derailed Bush’s planned focus on tax cuts and education. COVID put a damper on Trump’s economic initiatives in his first term. Flexibility and focus will both be important to achieving the strategies long-term goals.

I applaud that there is an effort to prioritize, as too often there isn’t a recognition that everything can’t be a top priority. Often policymakers do not admit that their strategies include the need for risk management, or accepting a greater possibility of surprise in some areas. With that in mind, I am personally taken aback not to see any mention of North Korea. Pyongyang poses a threat to U.S. allies in the region and potentially to the U.S. mainland. Conversely, the inclusion of language that ‘terrorist activity in an otherwise less consequential area might force our urgent attention’ is a realistic nod to the probability that some countries/regions not prioritized in the strategy will force their way on to the docket.

Finally, the desire to be a partner of first choice in the Western Hemisphere will require countries to be convinced of long-term U.S. reliability. Beijing and Moscow will almost certainly try to exploit this perceived Achilles heel to their advantage.” – Linda Weissgold, Former CIA Deputy Director for Analysis

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