Around the World with Academy Securities
In this month’s edition of Around the World with Academy Securities, our Geopolitical Intelligence Group (GIG) focuses on the following geopolitical tensions that we are monitoring:
- U.S. Increases Pressure on Maduro in Venezuela
- UN Approves Gaza Peace Plan
- Status of the Talks to End the War in Ukraine
- Tensions Between China and Japan
We begin this month’s ATW with an update on the situation in Venezuela, with the USS Ford Carrier Strike Group now in the region. The arrival of the Ford provides the U.S. with additional strike options, but as it will likely not be on station for a protracted period, the window for Maduro to talk is only open for a limited time. If these talks do not result in a positive outcome, there is potential that land strike options will be considered to further pressure the regime. Next, we revisit Gaza on the heels of the UN Security Council approving the Trump administration’s peace plan. This vote paves the way for a stabilization force to be assembled, trained, and deployed to Gaza, but the longer-term governance questions still remain, especially as Hamas has yet to disarm. In addition, we cover the latest developments in the war in Ukraine. The U.S. and Russia have produced a 28-point peace plan, but it is heavily slanted in Russia’s favor and includes Ukraine ceding territory that Russia does not control in the Donbas region, limiting the size of Ukraine’s postwar military, and restrictions around the long-range weapons it can possess (in exchange for U.S. security guarantees). We also cover the recent tensions between China and Japan over comments made by the Japanese PM regarding Taiwan. Japan is a key U.S. ally in the region and China’s response will have an economic impact on Japan. Finally, our GIG will keep an eye on Africa and U.S. engagement there in the coming months. However, in the near-term, the expectation is that the U.S. will continue to have a “transactional policy” and will focus on brokering stability in areas that could improve U.S. economic opportunity and access to natural resources.
Please reach out to your Academy coverage officer with any questions and we would be happy to engage.
Front and Center: U.S. Increases Pressure on Maduro in Venezuela
As the USS Ford Carrier Strike Group entered the waters of the Caribbean last week, it appeared that the clock is now ticking on the next steps regarding Venezuela. As we have reported, there have been over 20 strikes against suspected drug trafficking boats in the region. So far, the administration has held off on striking land-based drug (and military) targets in Venezuela. With the carrier group arriving, more options are now on the table to help achieve the end goal. That goal is still in question, however, but our expectation is that we will soon learn more about ultimate objective because the carrier will not be on station for an extended period of time. Maduro clearly feels the pressure and there have been reports of back-channel requests for talks with the Trump administration, which will likely happen in some form. However, with the designation of Cartel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), effective November 24, and the U.S. ready to move on to a “new phase” of operations, time is running out for Maduro. Whether the intent is to come to a diplomatic deal with Maduro for him to step aside in an orderly transition of power or for military strikes to be used to forcibly remove him from office is still unknown, but the bottom line is that the preparations that have been made in the Caribbean (now called Operation Southern Spear) have been a clear indication that the focus of this administration will be on securing the Western hemisphere and reducing the influence of China, Russia, and even Iran in our own backyard.
“Despite the military buildup off the shores of Venezuela, President Trump is more interested in making threats and signaling strength than in using military force to remove Maduro from power. As an isolationist at heart, Trump campaigned on avoiding foreign wars and is unlikely to get the U.S. involved in a prolonged military conflict in Venezuela. He likes to be seen as a winner, and although the U.S. is threatening military action inside Venezuela, it is expected that he will ultimately back down from the high risks involved with a ground invasion or a prolonged air campaign to achieve regime change. The military buildup serves to signal to both domestic and regional audiences that Trump is committed to closing the border, stopping drug trafficking, and reaffirming U.S. leadership in the Western hemisphere. The strategy extends beyond ousting Maduro, as Trump has shown a willingness to use military power to achieve geopolitical objectives, such as with strikes on drug trafficking boats and actions against Iran, ISIS, and the Houthis. The regional message is that the U.S. is prepared to exert greater influence in the Western Hemisphere to achieve its strategic goals. The administration views illegal immigration and drug trafficking as a foreign invasion, and deploying military force, including an aircraft carrier, is the strongest demonstration of military power. While Trump would like to see Maduro removed, his primary goal is to reassert U.S. influence in the region and convey to Americans that he is focused on the principles he campaigned on, such as sealing the border and stopping the flow of illegal immigrants and drugs into the U.S.” – General Robert Walsh
“President Trump is certainly more enamored with a ‘boots on the ground’ approach in Venezuela, but his military planners have outlined how costly and difficult such an undertaking could be – even in limited scope. A Monroe-esque demonstration of will and military capability may be appealing, but the cost of failure could just as easily embolden our more sophisticated competitors in the region. It is more likely that we’ll see a combination of continued pressure on the Maduro regime coupled with covert activities including financial, informational, cyber, and human source operations. The targeted strikes on alleged narco-traffickers will continue, and there may indeed be airstrikes on the Venezuelan mainland to drive home our resolve. Ultimately the U.S. and its regional partners would like to see Maduro deposed, but would settle for him slipping silently into the night somewhere far away. Should he signal that he is willing to consider such a diplomatic off-ramp it is likely the administration would accept those terms with the support of regional partners who fear the dire economic and humanitarian situation in Venezuela.” – General John Evans
“Since inheriting Venezuela from Hugo Chavez in April 2013, Maduro has been a master at entering negotiations to fend off domestic and international opposition. He has done this multiple times, often seeking the good offices of a third country, like Mexico or the Vatican, as host and to act as mediator. Note that despite these multiple rounds of negotiations and strings of broken promises over the past 12 years, Maduro and his clique are still in charge. Look for Maduro to offer yet another round as the Trump administration raises the pressure. A mere 1,800 Marines embarked on the Iwo ARG is not enough for anything other than a coastal raid somewhere. The set up is more likely for a range of air and missile strikes. As I’ve pointed out before, my own one-man opinion is that POTUS does not see strikes as war – hence strikes on Soleimani, the Iranian nuclear complexes, or (in the past during Trump 1.0) strikes on terror bases in Somalia and Libya or on chemical warfare assets in Syria, are better seen as shows of force. Theorists might say they build a larger deterrence through threats of possibly worse strikes. The mere deployment of forces also serves as a show of force, and as a warning of what might happen if the target country doesn’t change policies, and it provides POTUS with options should he choose to execute.” – General Rick Waddell
“We continue to set conditions in Venezuela by working to get regional partners fully on board with justifications for a change in leadership in Venezuela along with establishing conditions for a transition to a new democratic government under Edmundo Gonzalez. In a perfect world no military action will be required, and Maduro will go into self-exile, but if he does not, he will have to accept the potential consequences of decisive military action in the future supported by regional partners. Interesting that Machado was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, as this provides an opening if she were to be arrested or killed, since that would garner international support for action against the Maduro regime. Cartel de los Soles being designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on November 24 also opens opportunities for supporting justification for future decisive military action. If we don’t see Maduro go into self-exile prior to the aircraft carrier departing the Caribbean, expect to hear the administration claim victory in reducing drug trafficking and highlighting that they are in dialogue with Maduro.” – General KK Chinn
“The USS Ford Carrier Strike Group (CSG) is the most visible sign of a sustained, menacing U.S. presence close to Venezuela. That presence combines with the other instruments of U.S. power to maintain, and incrementally increase, pressure on Maduro. But that presence cannot be maintained indefinitely – global carrier positioning is a ‘use it or lose it’ proposition. The challenge for the administration will be to fully exploit the leverage gained from the Ford’s presence before it must leave station. Having deployed in early June of this year, that is no more than a few months away. Replacing one CSG in the Caribbean with another is unlikely, absent additional revelations of wrongdoing by Maduro’s regime that could justify use of military force inland. Secretary Rubio remains the key leader in the administration who has consistently pushed for escalation in SOUTHCOM. His statements should be watched most carefully.” – General David Beydler
“Certainly, POTUS is leveraging military might against a persistent drug threat, but there is much more. The diminution of Maduro is a message that resounds outside of regime hacks. Remember the people protesting in the streets when the U.S. tried to lift up a budding democracy (via Juan Guaido). That was eventually crushed by Maduro, but close-run. Maduro might believe he inherited the legacy of Chavez, but the wheels of state are coming off. Maduro is no Chavez. The larger implication is the restoration of the Caribbean as an American lake. The Russians, Cubans, and Nicaraguans all lose if the U.S. is persistent and thoughtful. This is more of an opportunity to build a broad Caribbean partnership than strike drug boats. That takes on the real threat of the Chinese capturing Central and South American economic and political narratives.” – General Michael Groen
“There is a significant commitment of U.S. military capacity in the Caribbean. In my view, this capacity far exceeds what’s required to intercept narcotics traffickers on the high seas. While I fully expect that there is military planning underway for potential expanded operations in Venezuela, I am inclined to the view that the primary intention for this deployment, right now at least, is to apply pressure on Maduro to step down. The U.S. goal, held for some time, is regime change in Venezuela. The U.S. administration would prefer a diplomatic route to achieve it, given the inherent uncertainty in the outcome of military operations. I do not, however, think that this diplomatic window is open-ended. Maintaining that level of force in the Caribbean, particularly the aircraft carrier presence, comes at a cost and impacts operational availability elsewhere. If there is no diplomatic progress, we may see additional military action, targeted at alleged narcotics infrastructure, to increase pressure on Maduro.” – Neil Wiley, Former Principal Executive, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
UN Approves Gaza Peace Plan
Last week, the UN Security Council approved President Trump’s peace plan in Gaza. This vote created the legal mandate to move beyond the ceasefire and onto stabilization and reconstruction in the war-torn region. Even though there have been intermittent violations of the ceasefire, it is still holding in Gaza. The vote provides the authority to create a multinational stabilization force and a “Board of Peace,” but does not specify which nations will have representatives on that board. However, while there is no guaranteed path to a Palestinian State, it does say that if the Palestinian Authority reforms and the situation in the strip improves following the beginning of reconstruction, “conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.” However, before any of the reconstruction can begin, Hamas must disarm and cede power, which is still the most difficult next step to achieve. With Iran significantly weakened in the region, the neighboring Arab countries are looking to move forward and forge a lasting peace in Gaza. This was evident in the MBS meeting with President Trump at the White House last week. At the meeting, hopes of Saudi Arabia officially joining the Abraham Accords were clear and the U.S. made the decision to sell Saudi ArabiaF-35s. However, with Hezbollah rearming (note the Israeli strike over the weekend that killed the Hezbollah chief of staff in Beirut) and tensions between Israeli settlers and Palestinians running high in the West Bank, there are many risks to the peace process moving forward.
“The meeting between President Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) highlighted a growing strategic partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Both leaders emphasized the importance of security cooperation, regional stability, and economic coordination. The Oval Office meeting underscored the significance of their relationship and elevated MBS’s global profile. They discussed plans to enhance investments and defense ties, including missile defense, counter-drone systems, and intelligence sharing, especially considering potential rising tensions with Iran. The conversation also addressed shared concerns about Red Sea security, Houthi attacks, and the stability of global energy shipping. Both sides reaffirmed the importance of maintaining strong bilateral ties amid shifting alliances in the Middle East. The discussion placed less emphasis on human rights and liberal values. While the U.S. encouraged Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords and recognize Israel, MBS insisted that any agreement must include a clear path to a two-state solution for the Palestinians. Trump expressed openness to a deal with Iran, and MBS offered to facilitate such negotiations. Additionally, Trump designated Saudi Arabia as a ’major non-NATO ally,’ boosting defense relations, and the two countries signed a joint declaration on civil nuclear cooperation.” – General Robert Walsh
“Hamas only has three remaining bodies to use as leverage. Their spokesmen have been emphatic that Hamas will not surrender weapons or political control or allow an international security force not run by the UN. These diverge from the agreed-upon 20-point peace plan. Nonetheless, the UN has now approved the Trump plan in the Security Council, which is remarkable, even though Russia and China abstained. Hard to think that Israel will withdraw to the next phase line unless Hamas meets the disarmament provisions. Likewise, Israel has been adamant that the Palestinian Authority is not adequate to govern Gaza (the UN-approved plan requires the PA to ‘reform’ before assuming control). In Lebanon, Israel has shown no hesitation in striking wherever Hezbollah reappears. The Lebanese government and Army have shown no meaningful activity to disarm Hezbollah as the deal ‘ending’ the war requires. Expect this situation to continue. With Tehran out of water and no easy solution in sight, Iran’s government will necessarily have to focus more internally for a while. The Iranian Foreign Minister recently stated that Iran no longer enriches uranium at any location, but it’s still not clear whether they plan to rebuild their nuclear enterprise. Therefore, the balance of regime effort and expenditure between domestic versus the nuclear enterprise remains to be seen.” – General Rick Waddell
“The ceasefire is not holding. Breaks from both sides are now routine. The conflict continues, albeit at much lower intensity, because Hamas remains the largely unopposed political/military power in Gaza. The fact remains, the IDF’s strategic aims in Gaza relative to Hamas’s remain unclear, at various times stated as the ‘elimination of Hamas as a military force,’ ‘destroying Hamas’s ability to govern and launch attacks from Gaza,’ ‘dismantling Hamas,’ ‘destroying Hamas,’ etc. Some of those stated objectives might well be impossible to achieve. In any case, Hamas remains viable regardless of stated Israeli goals. In the end, absent increased ceasefire observance, stabilization forces will not be introduced, and governance will remain by gunpoint. President Trump offering sales of F-35s to MBS marks a significant advance in U.S.-Saudi relations. However, the offer might simply be an enticement for Saudi support for a range of regional peace agreements with no real chance of U.S. approval and implementation of F-35 sales.” – General David Beydler
“The spirit of the Trump-MBS meeting is more important than its specifics, formalizing a strategic shift in the relationship that prioritizes deterrence, industrial benefits, and commerce. KSA now joins other regional partners (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar) as a major non-NATO ally. Together with the U.S.-Saudi Strategic Defense Agreement (details pending), this should streamline export controls and licensing and provide priority access to U.S. defense technology and financing. The Kingdom may never spend $1 trillion on U.S. tech, and certainly not all at once (expect project-by-project vetting against competing Saudi domestic needs). Further, the F-35 sale may never happen either (it’s worth noting that a 2020 agreement to sell F-35s to the UAE as part of the Abraham Accords has never been realized), largely due to American law that prohibits the sale of U.S. tech that is equal to anything we’ve sold to Israel (the common term for this is QME, or Qualitative Military Edge). Finally, the Crown Prince gave predictable statements about future relations with Israel. Given the Kingdom’s role as custodian of Islam’s holiest cities, it’s difficult for the Saudis to normalize relations until Palestinian issues are better resolved, but a solid, under-the-table relationship will continue. Regardless, this was a meaningful meeting that signals regional commitment, rewards strategic alignment, and expands defense industrial cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.” – General Karen Gibson
“Both Saudia Arabia and the UAE believe they now have access to all U.S. systems and products, beyond just the F-35. This will only be accelerated with the ‘final transition’ in Saudi anticipated before the end of the month, and movement on the Abraham Accords, regardless of the Palestinian issue. The big bet in the region, once MBS is officially in charge, is whether he’ll sign onto the Abraham Accords without a Palestinian solution. My bet is yes, as a signal of his authority and the direction he wants to take Saudi Arabia, and much less about Israeli support of his broader objectives, be it modernization, commercial, and defense. Think of the message this sends Iran. They and their surrogates are isolated and at greater risk than ever before.” – Admiral Robert Harward
“Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman almost certainly perceives his visit to Washington—a textbook example of pragmatism over idealism—as an unmitigated success. The visit left no doubt that his international rehabilitation is on track and won’t be an issue when he formally ascends to the throne. Despite a U.S. full-court press, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to sign on to the Abraham Accords until MBS becomes King. Given his father’s historic support for the Palestinian cause, he will probably be loath to make normalizing relations with Israel one of his early acts even if he is personally inclined to do so, especially if the ceasefire in Gaza remains tenuous and Israeli settlers continue to foment violence in the West Bank. Riyadh, however, is likely to continue to try to keep the Lebanon ceasefire on track, using its considerable clout to shore up Beirut’s attempts to try to keep Hezbollah in check. Such action will be needed to offset Iran’s efforts to help Hezbollah rearm. U.S. officials recently announced that despite its own economic troubles, Tehran has funneled at least $1 billion to Hezbollah this year, demonstrating that Iran is not cowed.” – Linda Weissgold, Former CIA Deputy Director for Analysis
Status of the Talks to End the War in Ukraine
As we addressed in our previous ATW, with optimism falling after the discussions over the past few months, the U.S. moved forward with a plan to sanction Russian oil companies Rosneft and Lukoil. This was the most recent action taken by the Trump administration to once again pressure Putin into returning to the table for talks to end the war. However, Russian forces are making additional territorial gains on the battlefield in Eastern Ukraine. As a result, U.S. and Russian officials have drawn up a new 28-point plan to end the war, which includes significant concessions on the part of Ukraine. It reportedly includes calls for Ukraine to cede the remainder of the Donbas, including land that Ukrainian forces still control, and significantly reducing the size of its military. The plan would also call for controls on the kinds of long-range weapons Ukraine could hold following the end of the war and an agreement to never join NATO. However, in return, the plan includes U.S. security guarantees. Ukraine was not involved in crafting this new plan, and it does include many redlines that Zelensky has pushed back on since the war began. However, the new effort appears to be taking Russia’s concerns into consideration in an effort to move the ball forward with Putin. Following EU and Ukrainian criticism of the draft, U.S.-Ukraine talks in Geneva have produced a “refined” version of the plan. With the constant bombardment of Ukraine’s infrastructure and additional reports of Russian involvement in a sabotage operation in Poland last week, Russia is attempting to demonstrate that the war can only be ended on its terms, so we will have to see how this latest plan to restart talks to end the war plays out.
“Russia remains India’s largest oil importer, but the pressure from the U.S. and Europe to reduce Russian oil purchases is significantly impacting state-owned refiners in India, leading them to cut back on imports. These actions are part of the refiners’ strategy to avoid the risk of secondary sanctions. Although India has not fully shifted away from Russian oil and remains discreet about its diversification efforts, it is gradually reducing its reliance on Russian imports due to geopolitical pressures, U.S. tariffs, sanctions on Russia’s shadow oil fleet, and its own economic and energy security goals. President Trump claimed that India’s Prime Minister Modi stated he would stop importing Russian oil, while India’s public announcement emphasized diversifying oil imports to ensure stable prices and secure supply, without directly addressing Trump’s comments. India is responding to Western efforts, resulting in significant reductions in Russian oil imports.” – General Robert Walsh
“It does look like the major Indian importers of Russian oil (e.g., Reliance Industries) are curtailing imports under the threat of sanctions. The Russian firm, Lukoil, is having difficulty raising capital by selling foreign holdings as counterparties are looking for U.S. assurances that they won’t face sanctions. Meanwhile, long-range Ukrainian strikes have reduced internal Russian refinery capacity by as much as a third, which affects the wider Russian economy and the military effort, but not necessarily the export market. Other than ramping up weapons deliveries to Ukraine, no remaining easy U.S. economic or diplomatic leverage is to be found. The ‘Witkoff Plan’ much discussed in the news – if the accounts are accurate – is a re-listing of Putin’s demands from the last couple of years, and were rejected by SecState Rubio a few months ago. Difficult to see Ukraine and its European supporters accepting the deal as described.” – General Rick Waddell
“I think this week will see a flurry of engagement by Ukraine and the European Union to modify the latest 28-point proposal that has been put forward by the U.S. and Russia. In its current form, I don’t think the Ukrainians will agree to move forward. I think there is a slim opportunity for Ukrainian concessions on territory if they can secure better language on security guarantees (no permanent exclusion from NATO, more fidelity on the collaborative military actions in response to renewed Russian aggression, reduced constraints on the size of their military, and additional economic investment for reconstruction). Russia may be willing to compromise in these areas if the territorial and economic concessions outlined in the plan hold.” – Admiral Kelly Aeschbach
“Russia has been highly effective in anticipating, planning for, and effectively mitigating the impact of sanctions for decades now. All told, sanctions have yet to significantly change Russia’s behavior. Additionally, Putin senses the U.S. is tiring of its support to Ukraine and that he is slowly winning. Putin will continue attacks on Ukraine unabated knowing time is on his side. Only increased and highly successful Ukrainian attacks on Russian strategic assets will change that thinking. Such attacks will only be possible with increased foreign support, namely from the U.S.” – General David Beydler
“We’ve been down this path before on the current ceasefire negotiations. While Russia is under economic pressure, Putin still sees himself in a position of strength and on a pathway to his maximalist goals. Historically ceasefires happen when one side no longer sees a path to victory – Putin is clearly not there. The real trading space and negotiations that are ongoing here are with Ukraine, the EU, and the U.S. I would assess with moderate confidence, anything from Russia, read Putin, will be performative, a delaying tactic, with no intent to implement anything that would resemble an agreement between the EU, U.S., and Ukraine.” – General Robert Ashley
“I still contend there will be no end to the conflict until post-winter. Putin is still in the best position for negotiation due to the oncoming winter and the U.S. push to end the conflict with an agreement rather than an initial ceasefire. Every year/winter that goes by allows Russia to continue building its military capacity. Since 2022 it has proven resilient in expanding its defense industry, though it is facing workforce shortages, potential high-tech initiative challenges due to sanctions, and some economic challenges due to alternative workforce uses and imposed sanctions. However, no one should underestimate Russia’s ability and willingness to suffer. In addition, the most recent U.S.-initiated peace plan appears to be right in line with Russia’s desires and counter to Ukraine’s. The one option that might make it acceptable to Ukraine is if the plan calls for NATO to defend Ukraine should Russia break the peace agreement. However, it is highly unlikely that Russia would ever agree to such a plan that would seemingly be equivalent to being a NATO member. The one positive in all of this is the greater role that European nations are taking in European security.” – General Steve Basham
“It appears that the U.S. administration is increasingly inclined to prioritize ‘stopping the killing’ over securing a strategically durable resolution. This effort to trigger negotiations and extract concessions may also reflect emerging signals of a desired stabilization in U.S.–Russia relations. Whatever the intention, Moscow reads it as an invitation to bargain — with Europe unprepared and reactive. The result is a growing risk of a premature ceasefire shaped largely by Russian leverage rather than Western design. Ukraine is being pushed towards a binary choice between exhaustion, in the absence of full U.S. support, and concessions to the aggressor. Such an outcome would freeze the conflict on terms that legitimize territorial conquest, erode Ukraine’s long-term viability, fracture European security, and illustrate to other adversaries that the United States can be maneuvered into conflict-termination mode through pressure and endurance.” – General Sir Nick Parker
Tensions Between China and Japan
Earlier this month, the Japanese PM made a few remarks around the topic of Taiwan that has resulted in a significant blowback. Essentially, at a parliamentary hearing on November 7, she referenced that a military incident involving Taiwan could be construed as a “survival-threatening situation” suggesting Tokyo might treat Chinese military action against Taiwan as grounds for military involvement (Japan has since said its policies have not changed, but rather the PM was just reiterating them). Following the remarks, China suspended imports of sea food and cautioned its citizens about traveling to Japan. There is also talk of Japanese film bans, and all of these measures are designed to have an immediate economic impact on Japan. It is important to note that China is Japan’s largest trading partner, accounting for over 20% of its total trade. In addition, China has sent military ships to patrol disputed waters. However, in the near-term, it is unlikely that the Japanese PM will retract the statement, so this tension will exist for the foreseeable future.
“This situation reflects Japan’s alignment with the U.S. in countering China’s growing assertiveness towards its neighbors. The U.S. is intensifying its efforts to strengthen alliances with Asian partners to deter Chinese coercive actions. By reinforcing its military presence and utilizing diplomatic and economic measures, the U.S. aims to manage the risk of escalation without provoking direct confrontation. Following President Trump’s recent meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping, concerns have arisen in Taiwan and Japan about the possibility of the U.S. reducing its support for Taiwan, thereby jeopardizing their security. Takaichi is pushing for a clear affirmation of U.S. support for Taiwan, rather than allowing it to become a bargaining chip in negotiations with China. The credibility of U.S. deterrence with its allies relies on the belief that the U.S. will act to counter China.” – General Robert Walsh
“The newest Chinese aircraft carrier – the Fujian – is now supposedly fully operational. The home port for the ship will be the southernmost city on Hainan Island, which places it at the opening of the South China Sea: a clear statement of Chinese intent. The next carrier is under construction, and looks to be the size of the USS Ford, and may be nuclear-powered. If the PM truly feels that Chinese action against Taiwan could be existential for Japan, then nations facing such threats normally ‘bandwagon’ with the most threatening power through some form of acquiescence, or they ‘balance’ against that threat by finding allies. Since Japan has a defense treaty with the U.S., if they choose balancing, they will turn to the U.S. The Trump administration is likely to ask what Japan is prepared to do to defend itself before demanding U.S. assistance.” – General Rick Waddell
“The Chinese ‘rift’ with Japan goes back centuries and won’t go away despite what we do or don’t hear about it. As tightly connected as our economies are, we need to continue to take a ‘whole of government’ approach to how we deal with China.” – General Brian Cavanaugh
“It’s a positive step that the administration approved the sale of military arms to Taiwan this week, signaling that it will not bow to pressure from China in this area. China has strongly condemned the arms sales and reportedly increased military activity around Taiwan again. China will continue to use coercive tactics with all countries in the region in order to bolster its claims to Taiwan and the South China Sea. If the U.S. escalates military action against Venezuela, China may see opportunities to further encroach in disputed regional areas.” – Admiral Kelly Aeschbach
“China will continue to flex its muscles throughout the region consolidating gains, modernizing capabilities, extending claims in the South China Sea, and expanding those gains into the broader western Pacific. Its newest carrier will lead that expansion. The rift with Japan is not subsiding. Diplomatic tensions and military confrontations in the air and on the sea continue unabated. ‘Defense of Taiwan is Defense of Japan,’ a phrase increasing heard from the Japanese, suggest the best place for the U.S. to fit is with Japan and PM Takaichi.” – General David Beydler
“China will continue to push trade multilateralism as they did at ASEAN and APEC by championing inclusive growth, opposing protectionism, and by signing an upgraded China-ASEAN free trade agreement. ASEAN trade links are deep and dependent on their #1 trade partner, China. China will continue to punish countries through economic coercion if they speak ill of them or about supporting Taiwan, as we have just observed with the comments from Japan’s new PM, resulting in China limiting travel to Japan and halting imports of seafood. Japan will weather this storm as seafood imports were just restarted after a 2-year suspension. Expect to see China work to push new military normals in the East China Sea around the Senkaku islands much like they have done around Taiwan and the SCS with the Philippines. All condition setting but increasing the risk for an inadvertent mishap that will raise tensions in the region. Expect another China trade deal to be announced in April 2026 when President Trump visits Beijing so it alleviates the pressure to make a deal just before the mid-term elections.” – General KK Chinn
