CMBS Credit Focus Non-Trust Debt: Check the Seniority of Your CMBS Collateral

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CXP Office Portfolio Modification Spotlights Senior Non-Trust Exposures

The recent modification of the \$484.7 million CXP Office Portfolio loan (CXP 2022-CXP1) spotlights CMBS workout implications when most of the collateral debt is not securitized, sitting outside the trust. Investors need to consider a whole slew of data, including updated collateral valuations, appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs), and modification terms, in the context of the overall debt stack. If the CMBS underlying notes are also subordinate to non-trust notes, this adds another wrinkle, as is the case in the CXP1 deal.

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Notably, the CXP modification dramatically reduced the coupons of the CMBS two underlying notes to a fixed rate of 0.019% (from 4.6% and 5.5% over SOFR), turning the forgone payments into "hope amounts" (Figure

1). In contrast, the \$1.07 billion non-trust senior notes continue to receive regular payments. The modification template states that the hope amounts may be paid down following property releases, introducing a potential adverse selection <u>concern</u>.¹ Properties such as 201 California Street and 650 California Street in San Francisco, CA, appear particularly weak compared to other properties in the portfolio, based on reported financials.

Asset	CXP Office Portfolio	
Deal	CXP 2022-CXP1	
Property Type / Size	Office portfolio consisting of 7 buildings, totaling ~2.7 million square feet	
Location (% of sq. ft.)	New York (39.6%), San Francisco (26.5%), Boston (9.9%) and Jersey City, NJ (24.0%)	
	Pre-Modification	Post-Modification (May 2024)
Loan Status	Matured	Current (Specially Serviced)
Loan Balance (\$psf)	\$1,717,842,628 (\$622 psf)	\$1,717,842,628 (\$622 psf)
Coupon / Amortization	SOFR + 270 bps (8.02% rate April 2024) / Interest-only	~4.076% rate May 2024 / Interest-only
Maturity	December 2023	July 2025
Extension Options	Three one-year extension options to December 2026	One extension option to January 2026
Extension Terms	Extension options: (a) No event of default, (b) purchase of new SOFR cap at greater of i) 2.885% and ii) strike rate that would result in 1.05x DSCR, and (c) borrower pays all fees/costs	Extension option: (a) No termination event, (b) minimum 10 business days notice, (c) no event of default, (d) minimum 4.0% det yield, (e) concurrent extension of mezzanine loan, and (f) payment of out-of-pocket extension costs from the collateral accounts
Other Terms		Current-pay coupon modification and "hope amounts": * Current-pay interest on the junior-most \$644 million of the \$1.7 billion mortgage loan shall be modified from SOFR + 520.9 bps to a fixed rate of 0.01428% (0.019% on \$484.7 million and 0.0% on \$160.0 million) * Interest will continue to accrue at SOFR +520.9 bps but will
		become "Hope Amounts" that shall only be payable to the extent there are adequate proceeds upon the release of any property.


Figure 1. CXP Office Portfolio Loan and Property Parameters

Source: Deal Documents, Morningstar Credit, and Academy Securities

^{1 &}quot;Release Prices: Cherry Picking Across Office Portfolios, Sometimes at a Discount," CMBS Credit Focus, Academy Securities, April 13, 2023

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The market may see more situations where the CMBS debt is subordinate to non-trust notes. Originators looking to reduce CRE exposure, especially to riskier parts of the debt stack, could look to securitize subordinate mortgage notes, similar to CXP. This marks a shift from how CMBS investors need to account for non-trust debt, that typically comes in the form of pari-passu mortgage notes, or subordinate B notes and mezzanine debt (which CXP also features, Figure 2).





To be sure, the presence of both pari-passu notes and mezz debt already creates challenges in deal reporting and workout dynamics, as we discussed in previous reports. For example, it may not be clear how servicers allocate cashflows across the securitized and non-securitized components, as the recent \$105.1 million holdback release in GSMS 2021-RENT showed (the RENT deal received only ~\$40 million of the overall <u>release</u>).² In turn, mezz lender actions could impact workout directions, either positively or adversely, depending on the mezz lender's <u>incentives</u>.³

Track Total Loan Reports

The prevalence of complex debt stacks that are divided into trust and non-trust notes (or across several trusts, for that matter) puts a focus on the IRP's somewhat obscure Total Loan **Report.** The report, part of a package of eight so-called supplemental status reports servicers release monthly, shows total debt stacks, including items such as current balances, note rates, and delinquency status. The information in the total loan report is particularly important as

Source: Deal Documents and Academy Securities

^{2 &}quot;Releasing Holdbacks: RENT is Writing Up Bonds," CMBS Credit Focus, Academy Securities, April 29, 2024

^{3 &}quot;Securitized Mezz: Workout Dynamics in Public Display," CMBS Credit Focus, Academy Securities, July 17, 2023



cashflow systems do not readily show non-CMBS components. Investors can typically see on the systems other securitized pari-passu exposures, but not the non-securitized ones. However, we find that populated total loan reports are not always available, even across CMBS deals where the prospectus clearly shows non-securitized notes.

Appraisals and ARAs in the Context of the Total Debt Stack

The situation at CXP illustrates how critical data points such as appraisals and ARAs should be related to the overall debt stack, including non-securitized components. The seven-property office portfolio latest reported valuation is \$1.56 billion, significantly higher than the outstanding balance on the CXP1 deal. Of course, the subordination of the trust notes means the trust would stand last in line to see any mortgage payments down the road. In turn, the CXP1 remittance report shows an ARA of \$152.1 million on the heels of the recent valuation. This amount seemingly does not tie into the standard ARA formula that subtracts 90% of the appraised value from the sum of the outstanding principal balance, advances, reserves, and several other items. Separate deal reporting shows that the overall ARA was \$312.1 million. The ARA amount was first applied to the non-trust B note, appraising it out, and only then reached the CMBS trust.

All told, investors may already be aware of the need to consider related debt components that are not directly backing their CMBS exposures. But varying mortgage seniority levels, and especially the presence of non-trust components, add another layer of complexity. In Figure 3 we show several SASB deals backed by subordinate mortgage positions. Aside from CXP1, there are several office SASB deals that are almost entirely backed by subordinate mortgage notes.




Figure 3. SASB Mortgage Seniority

Source: Deal Documents, Morningstar Credit, and Academy Securities



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Securitized Products Special Topics:

Net Leases: Scarcity Value as Issuance Poised to Pick Up Small Balance Commercial: Periphery Locations and "Weak" Sponsors May Prove Supportive Recovery Bonds: Deal Reporting Shows True-Up Adjustments Potency Data Centers: Performance Wrinkles to Test Operators' Role Recovery Bonds: Diversifying Exposure Moves Beyond Disasters Investor Non-QM: Pockets of Value as Underwriting Tightens Multifamily Prepays: Becoming Less Common, as Property Sales Drop Device Payment ABS: Expect Stable Performance as Collateral Evolves **CRE CLO Mods: Rising Volume Not Immediately Telegraphing Distress** Aircraft ABS: Waterfalls Playing Catch-Up as Fundamentals Recover Data Centers: Teakeaways from 2023-Vintage Deals Litigation ABS: Tailwinds in Place for an Uncorrelated Segment Agency Floaters: Adjusting Interest Rate Cap Escrows Equipment ABS: Pick Your Spots Amid Diverging Collateral Trends Commercial Solar ABS: Emergent Segment to Alleviate Headline Risks Multifamily CRT: Limited Credit Risk on Synthetic Exposures OC Triggers: Subtle Thresholds Come to the Fore As Collateral Stress Builds Up Cell Towers: Lender-Friendly Features Dovetail with Secular Tailwinds **Timeshare ABS: Exposure to Favorable Hospitality Segments** Self Storage: Aspects to Watch as Performance Decelerates Transitional Multifamily: Collateral Migration Away from CRE CLO Offers Different Deal Profile Recovery Bonds: No Need to Closely Watch the Fed or the Economy Here Affordable Mortgages: Fee Elimination Spotlights Convexity Profile Investor Non-QM: Rental Exposure with Some Structural Twists Data Centers: A Strong Segment Juggles ABS and CMBS Small Balance Multifamily: Value Ahead of Slow Prepays Future Funding: Potential Key Performance Driver as CRE CLO Pipeline Builds Up Multifamily Prepays: Property Sales Trigger Paydowns Manufactured Housing: Resilient Segment Amid Potential Multifamily Softness Tender Offers: Expect More to Come, Though Not on a Predictable Schedule NYC Multifamily: Rent Increases to Support Cashflows Amid Regulatory Restrictions Housing at a Crossroads: Single-family and Multifamily Exposures Senior Housing: Focus on Segment Selection Amid Pandemic Impact Disaster Performance: Pandemic Forbearance Resolutions Bode Well for Future Stresses Russian Sanctions Impact: Lease Terminations and Forced Property Sales



CMBS Credit Focus:

Recovering Shortfalls: Credit IO Value in Distressed Office Releasing Holdbacks: RENT is Writing Up Bonds Reserves vs Advances: Servicers Tap Reserves to Lower Advances Forward Forbearances: One Market Plaza Introduces a Twist to Mods Loan Assumptions: Watch Waterfalls as New Borrowers Redevelop Holdbacks: RENT in the Limelight, as Other Cases Brewing Blanket NRAs: Shutting Down Advances Upends Credit IO Trades Credit 2024: Workout Nuances Come to the Fore Recovering the Non-Recoverable: Liquidation Nuance Bolsters Paydowns Special Servicer Replacements: 1740 Broadway Crystalizes Implications Crossgates Liquidation: Holdbacks Complicate Severity Projections WODRA: Bond Cashflows Under Stress in Post-Mod Advance Recovery Securitized Mezz: Workout Dynamics in Public Display Dark Triggers: Nuances in Focus as Tenant Departures and Subleasing Pick Up Upping Appraisals: Recovering Valuations Reverse Shortfalls Non-Recoverable Advances: Unveiling a Rationale for a Key Decision Excess Cash Allocations: Probing Advances on Positive Cashflowing Loans Release Prices: Cherry Picking Across Office Portfolios, Sometimes at a Discount Mezz Loan Sales: A Potential Headache for CMBS Workouts Equity Pledges: Hotel Bossert Spotlights Dual Collateralized Loans The Road to Conversion: Consider Office Ground Leases and ARD Loans Credit 2023: Advancing and Workout Approaches to Play a Central Role Hotel Receiverships: Palmer House Hilton Spotlights Stabilization Efforts Office Modifications: 285 Madison May Offer a Blueprint for More to Come Triple-A Shortfalls: Destiny Spotlights Delayed ASERs Impact Inflation-Resistant Leases: Rent Steps Offer Some Revenue Protection, though Not Much Industrial Delinguencies: Don't Happen Often, but Watch Closely When They Do Hotel Reserves: Key Performance Driver after Pandemic-Driven Depletion **Government Tenants: Short Termination Notices and Specialized Properties** Mall Foreclosures: What to Track as Servicers May Shift Away from Modifications



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